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Long Island Sound is a magnificent estuary,' stretching over 110
miles from the windy eastern stretches of water and sand at itsjunction with the Atlantic Ocean, to its western end where it meets
Manhattan's East River amidst one of the nation's most urbanized
areas.* Draining a watershed of 16,000 square miles reaching
* Associate Professor of Law, Center for Environmental Legal Studies, Pace University
School of Law. The author would like to thank the numerous individuals who provided
comments and encouragement Special thanks must go to Professors~ e f f r Miller,
e~
Nicholas
Robinson and David Wooley for their wise counsel and generous support, and to research
assistants, Eric Andreas and Andrew Provence, for their hard work and good cheer. The
trading analysis especially benefited from Andrew's creative conuibutions.
1. An estuary is a semienclosed body of water where fresh and saltwater mix. SeeJOHN A.
KNAUSS, INTRODU~ION
TO P ~ I OCEANOGRAPHY
W
38 (1978). 'Estuary" and 'estuarine
zone" are also defined specifically in the Clean Water Act. &Clean Water Act Q 104(n) (4),
33 U.S.C. 1254(n) (4) ("estuary' means all or p a n of. .. the connection with open sea and
within which the sea water is measurably diluted with fresh water derived from land drainage"); Clean Water Act § 320(k). 33 U.S.C. § 1330(k) ('estuarine zone' includes 'associated
aquatic ecosystems and those portions of tributaries draining into the estuary up to the h i s
toric height of migration of anadromous fish or the historic head of tidal influence, whichever is higher").
2. &LONG ISLANDSOU- STUDY[hereinafter LISS] , COMPREHENSIVE
CONSERVATION
AND
MANAGE MEN^
1 (1994) [hereinafter CCMP]. Long Island Sound is bordered by Connecticut and New York, but its,watershed encompasses all of Connecticut, those pans of New
York lying near the Sound, as well as substantial portions of Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and Vermont. It reaches into Canada, where the headwaters of the Connecticut River lie.
For practical and managerial reasons, efforts to restore Long Island Sound focus on the watershed within Connecticut and New York. See id at 1.

Heinonline - - 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 138 1998

19981

:

Reducing Nitrogen Pollution

139

northward to Canada, with a population of almost eight and a half
million
it is home to a great diversity of plants, animals
and fish.' With an estimated annual value exceeding $5 billion
from commercial and recreational fishing, beach swimming and
boating: the Sound provides jobs and recreation, and solace to the
soul.6 Beneath the surface beauty, however, troubles abound. Fish
catches are down, species diversity continues to decline and the waters are often unappealing, and occasionally unsafe.'
Of the numerous pollution problems facing Long Island Sound,
the most prominent is over-enrichment of its waters by excess nitrogen. That nitrogen derives from numerous sources, but primarily from sewage treatment plants which dot the Sound's shores and
tributaries. The cost of improved sewage treatment is dauntingly
high for many of the localities, faced as they are with competing
needs for scarce tax dollars. Those costs may vary with the age and
condition of the individual treatment plant, and the benefits to be
gained in improved water quality in the Sound as a whole may shift
according to the location of the particular plant. These factors
have led to the suggestion that pollutant trading among plants
might potentially achieve water quality goals in a more cost efficient manner than a traditional regulato~yprogram alone. That
has, in turn, engendered interest in establishing some .type of market based nitrogen trading program, focusing either on the Sound
as a whole or on one of the states bordering it.
Although some of the earliest literature directed at managing water bodies and their watershedsaexplored market type trading: the
3. CCMF', supra note 2, at 3.
4. &CCMP, supra note 2, at 101-02; Elsa Brenner, L.I. Sound Still Shy a C k n Bill of Ha&
The N.Y. Times, July 7,1996, ~ ~ ~ ' ( ~ e s t c h weekly),
e s t e r at 1.
5. CCMF', supra note 2, at 2.
6. Economists speak more prosaically of the benefits of protecti~igand presexving a resource such as the Sound, evaluating such elements as recreation, commercial fishing,
"option value", and 'existence value." The option d u e is'the value to an individual of preserving the option of using the resource in the future. The "existence value" encompasses
all nonuse-related values; it is the amount a person would be willing to pay for water quality
improvements even though the person does not anticipate ever using the resource. &Alan
J. Krupnick, ReducingBay Nuhienb: An EconumicPenpcti~47 MD.L. REV. 452,457 (1988).
' 7. For example, a series of sewage spills in June 1997 led health officials to dose twenty
six.beaches in Westchester County, W , as well as beaches in the Bronx and Connecticut
Spilled Scwngc Clarcs h h c s in WcsIthcsln;N.Y. TIMU,June 18,1997, at BS;John T. McQuiston, More Beach are C l a d by Scwagc, N.Y. TIMES,
June 19, 1997, at B4,Michael Cooper, Snu
ogc Spill Ban Swimming at 27Benches. N.Y. nMES.June 29.1997, at 1/23.
8. A watershed or drainage basin is the land mass which drains into a stream, river, lake,
estuary or other body of water. For a discussion of the various terms see Robert W. Mler,
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device has been primarily employed in dealing with air pollution
under the federal Clean Air Act, most notably the sulfur dioxide
trading program mandated by the Clean Air Act to reduce acid
deposition.'0 However, not all observers are supportive of such
market experiments.
Scholars, advocates and agencies have for some time debated the
efficacy and utility of market based incentives for pollution control." In one comer are those, often economists, who contend that
market instruments, rather than regulation, are the most efficient
way to prevent environmental damage and restore degraded resources.'* They point particularly to the acid deposition program
as a model for employing pollution trading to achieve environmental ends in a cost effective manner. In the other comer are
those, including many environmentalists, who believe that market
solutions, particularly pollution trading, achieve little, are overly
complex to administer and enforce, and fail to reduce pollution
where most needed; they often view the monetization of the right
to pollute as an abdication of environmental principles.'3 They
Addressing B a n i m to Watmhed Aotcctirm, 25 ENVTL.L. 973,976 & n.7 (1995), and references
cited therein.
9. Sec MARC J. ROBERTS,River Basin Authorities: A National Soluiion to Water Pollution, 83
HARV.L. REV. 1527 (1970).
10. Sec Clean Air Act §§ 410416, 42 U.S.C. $5 76511-76510 (1994). The add deposition
program is discussed in Pan 11, C, 5, infia.
11. Market based environmental policies are those which depend on financial incentives,
or disincentives, to achieve desired environmental goals. They may include such mechaAND
nisms as fees, subsidies, and marketable rights. Sec OFFICEOF POLICY,PLANNING,
EVALUATION,
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
P R O T E ~ I OAGENCY,
N
21P-200 1, ECONOMIC
INCENTIVES:
OPTIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECrION, 1-2-14 (1991). For a general discussion of
regulatory and market mechanisms from which policy makers can choose for implementing
environmental policies, sec ROBERT
W. HAHN,A PRIMER
ON ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY DESIGN
412 (1989); OFFICEOF TECHNOW ASSESSMENT,U.S. CONGRESS,
ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY
Tools (1995) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICYTOOLS].
12. Sec, e.6, Bruce k Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart. R e f m i n g Envimnmmtal Law: The
D-atic
CUMfor Ma& Incmtivcr, 13 COLUM.J . ENVTL.L. 171 (1988) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart 19881; Bruce k Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Rcfming Environmental
Law, 37 STAN.L. REV. 1333 (1985) [hereinafter Ackerman & Stewart 19851. Sec ako infia
note 56.
13. There are dear philosophical differences which stem from divergent views of ecological resources and pollution. Stated in extreme terms, one view sees nature as a resource to
be exploited, and to the extent it can be polluted without obvious harm then it is to man's
economic advantage to d o so. Trading rights to pollute is simply an extension of this view.
Scc Robert W. Hahn, Economic A m ' p t i o n s for Environmental Problem: How the P a t k t Followed
rhc Doctor> Ordm,J . OF ECON.P E R s P E 95,
~ 110 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn, Doctor's Ordcn] (industry believes its claims on environmental resources represent property rights).
The contrary view sees nature as good and pollution as bad. The suggestion that one might
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criticize the trading programs, including the acid deposition program, arguing that the same degree of pollution reduction might
have been achieved using traditional regulatory controls," and that
the trading system fails to protect the vulnerable populations and
ecosystems and may delay full compliance with regulatory goals.15
Still, the acid deposition trading program has encouraged market advocates to explore the applicability of pollution trading programs to water pollution, land use and even climate change problems.16 Trading programs already have been undertaken to control
purchase rights to pollute raises serious moral concerns. S~RJCHARD
A. LIROFF,REFORMING
POLLUTION REGULATION:
THE TOIL AND TROUBLEOF EPA'S BUBBLE9-10 (1986)
[hereinafter LIROFF, TOIL& TROUBLE]; Michael J. Sandel, It's Immmal to Buy the Right to Pod
lute, N.Y TIMES,Dec. 15, 1997, at A23;James T.B. Tripp & Daniel J. Dudek, Institutional
Gui&lincsfm Designing Sucussful Transfmable Rights Programs, 6 YALE
J. ONREG. 369,370 & n.4
(1989); Adam J. Rosenberg, Emissions Credit Futura Contracts on the Chitogo Board of Trodc:
Rcgonal and Rational GWknges to the Rzght to Pollute, 13 VA.EWL. L.J. 501,52526 & n.158
(1994); Michael P. Vandenbergh, An Alrcnurtive to M y , Fire, A i m A New Framnuork to L i d
Environmental Targets in Environmental Law, 85 KY. L.J. 803,856-858 & nn.230-231 (1997). Sce
ako Jane B. Baron &Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market R n t i d Q : Moral Cntigucc of Econmnic
Ana4si.s in +l
T h q , 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 431, 436-437 (1996) (environmental ethics hostile to economic analysis); Hahn, Doclor's Ordm, supra note 13, at 111 (environmentalists fear
that market alternatives will give legitimacy to polluting). While most individuals' views fall
somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, the moral overtones often enter into the debate.
.See Marshall J. Breger, Richard B. Stewart, E. Donald Elliott, David Hawkins, Rwiding Ewnomic Incmtivcs in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALEJ. ON REG. 463, 46470, 480 (1991)
(speeches before the Administrative Conference of the U.S.) [hereinafter Breger et aL, J+ovidingEconomic Incmtiva] (dangerous to put in place any system that created legal rights to a
given level of pollution; the issue does not revolve around rights to pollute, but temporuy
permission; D. Hawkins) (regulation is also a license to pollute, for free; R Stewart).
14. Sec David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Econmnic Incenlive Aogram?: Rqlan'ng the
Command and Control/Ecaomic Incmtive Didrotmny, 55 WASH.& LEE L. REV. (forthcoming
1998) (manuscript on file with the author). Professor Driesen suggests that the term
'economic incentive" is poorly defined, but often is conuasted with traditional regulatory
measures, ignoring the fact that such measures themselves often create strong economic
incentives. This leads critics to exaggerate the disadvantages of traditional regulation and
minimize its advantages.
15. Sw James Dao, A New, Unregulated Madel: Selling the Rqht to Pollute, N.Y. TIMES,Feb. 6,
1993,at Al. Opponents of trading may also point to the potential for uneven distribution of
pollution impacts and the concomitant issue of environmental justice. See EPA Weigh EnvironmentalJurtim Impactr ofEmissions Trading Aograms, INSIDE
EPA, Sept 5,1997, (Weekly Report), at 20 (community group contendsaading program violates Civil Rights Act by d i s
proportionately impacting disadvantaged communities); Eileen Gauna,
Federal
Envinmmenhl Citixen Aovirimrc: Obstacles and Incmtiva on the Ruad to EnvironmeritalJustice, 22
EC0ux;vL.Q. 1,72 (1995) (trading programs may lead to 'hot spots" in poor and minority
communities); Lisa Heinzerling, SellingPollution. Forcing Democracy, 14 STAN.ENCIZ. L.J.300.
343 (1995) (distributional problems arise if pollution tnding programs do not assure meaningful citizen participation). Sce also LIROW,TOIL& TROUBLE,supra note 13, at 10;
16. Trading on a global scale currently is being suggested by the Administration as a
mechanism for addressing carbon dioxide and other emissions which contribute to global
AIR
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water pollution in specific water bodies," both from point source
dischargers and from overland runoff, or nonpoint s~urces.'~
These programs have sometimes been controversial, but interest in
trading remains strong at the federal level, and in some localities.
This interest is stimulated in part by the growing recognition that
some water quality problems can be addressed only on a large geographic scale. A federal policy shift toward increasing emphasis on
watershed management coincides with, and perhaps encourages,
consideration of trading schemes.
The purpose of this article is to examine the legal adequacy of
proposals now under consideration for a nitrogen trading program
on Long Island Sound, and to assess the likelihood of success in
light of the experience with other trading programs, both for water
and air pollution. Part I outlines the current environmental condition of Long Island Sound and explains the factors which have led
proponents of trading to believe such a program could be effective.
In Part I1 we consider the essential elements of a trading program,
and the lessons to be learned from the Clean Air Act programs.
Part I11 examines the federal policy framework within which water
pollutant trading may take place, while Part IV analyzes the legal
framework and explains the ways by which a trading program may
be crafted to fit within it. Part V reviews existing water trading programs and the lessons to be learned from their successes and failures. Part VI undertakes a rigorous analysis of the specific proposal
under consideration for Long Island Sound, evaluating both its legal adequacy and the likelihood that a sufiicient market driver
would be created to provide economically efficient environmental
results. Part VII concludes that although a Long Island Sound pollutant trading program can be accommodated within the frarnewarming. See Peter Passell, Global Warming Plan Would Make Emissions a Cummodify, N.Y.
TIMES,
Oct. 24, 1997, at Dl; set aLso John H . Cushman, Jr., Pollution Politics: Clintun's Choice
N.Y. T ~ M E
JUNE
~ , 27,1997, at A1 1; Peter Passell, Wanhd: A G h l Warming Poky that Stands a
Chance, N.Y.TIMES,
Oct. 2,1997, at D2.
17. Water pollutant trading may be referred to as effluent trading, water quality trading,
or nutrient trading if that is the pollutant to be traded. Set Surface Water Quality Division,
Michigan Department of Environmental Quality, Introduction to Market-Based Program 1 3
(visited Dec. 20, 1997) <http://www.deq.state.mi.us/swq/trading/htm/intro.htm>
[hereinafter Introduction to Markef-BasedPrograms].
18. The term 'point source" is generally used to indicate a facility which discharges its
waste through a pipe. 'Point source" is defined in Clean Water Act Section 502(14) as "any
discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.. ." 33 U.S.C. 5 1362 (14) (1995)
[hereinafter C.WA.1 The term "nonpoint source" is typically used when referring to uncontrolled runoff.

.
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work of the Clean Water Act, the factual predicates for such a program have yet to be established, and practical and policy concerns
make such a trading program problematic.

A.

The Hypoxia Problem

The Long Island Sound Study (LISS) was begun in 1985 to examine the water quality problems confronting the sound.Ig It focused particularly on the low levels of dissolved oxygen (DO), a
condition known as hypoxia, in parts of the Sound during the
summer months. Its research identified excess nitrogen as the major cause of the low DO levels.*' Nitrogen, an nutrient essential for
plant growth and survival, can disrupt the natural balance of a water body when present at high levels. It fuels the growth of algae
which eventually die, sink to the bottom, and decompose. The decomposition process consumes oxygen, thereby reducing the
amount available generally in the ambient water, depriving fish
and other aquatic life of the oxygen critical to sustain them.21 One
19. The Long Island Sound Study got underway as the result of a congressional appropriation for EPA and the coastal states of Connecticut and New York to assess the water quality of the Sound. CCMF', supra note 2, at 5. Following enactment of the Clean Water Act
Amendments of 1987, Long Island Sound was selected to participate in the National Estuary
.Program, and the Long Island Sound Study Management Conference, which included federal, state and local officials, representatives of indusuy, public interest groups, and academic institutions, Clean Water Act § 320 (c), 33 U.S.C. 5 1330(c), was charged with gathering data and assessing the condition of the estuary, identifying the causes of environmental
problems, and developing a Comprehensive Consemtion and Management Plan to recommend priority corrective actions and compliance schedules to address those problems.
Clean Water Act 5 320 (b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1330 (b).
20. LISS, H W ~ X ~AND
A NUTRIENTENRICHMENT-ASSESSMENT
OF CONDT~IONS
AND
MANAGEMEW
RECOMMENDATIONS
iii (1993) (hereinafter HYPOXIA
STUDY).Hypoxia is generally considered to exist when dissolved oxygen levels dip below 3 mg/l, the level t h ~ ; ~ h t
by biologists necessary to sustain healthy marine life. CCMF', supra note 2, at 11; LISS, H y
poxia in Lung Island Sound, Table 1.
21. In general, the maximum amount of dissolved oxygen which water can hold at typical
summer water temperatures is 7.5 mg/l. HmXIA STUDY,supra note 20, at 1. The states
have set water quality standards for dissolved oxygen at levels which are intended to protect
aquatic organisms. Those standards are 5 mg/l in New York and 5 to 6 mg/l in ~onnecticut, depending on the type of waters involved. Id at 13. SecN.Y. COMP.CODESR& REGS. tit.
6.5 703.3 (1991); CONN.AGENCIES
REGS. § 111 (1996). Annual monitoring has shown levels
as low as 0 mg/l (anoxia). In 1989 nearly 60% (over 500 square miles) of Sound bottom
waten contained less than 3 mg/l. HWXIASIZIDY. supra note 20. at 2. As recently as 1994.
25 percent of the Sound had unhealthy levels of oxygen during the late summer. LISS,
P R O P O FOR
~
PHASEI11 ACTIONS FOR HmXIA MANAGEMENT[hereinafter PWE 111
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obvious manifestation of this problem is the fish kills which are not
uncommon in some of the bays and harbors surrounding the
sound: but hypoxia can have more subtle effects on the develop
ment of marine organisms and on species composition.23
Hypoxic conditions do not occur uniformly throughout the
Sound, and tend to be most severe during the summer months in
the western end of the Sound, which, not surprisingly, is the area
of highest population concentration and sewage treatment plant
loadings.24While hypoxia has been recorded in the Sound over the
decades, the evidence suggests that it is becoming more common
and more severe.25
The nitrogen flowing into the Sound comes from numerous
sources, including fertilizer used on farm fields and urban lawns,
septic tanks, animal wastes, and even air pollution. 26 However the
primary contribution is from the more than one billion gallons a
PROPOSAL]5 & Fig. 3 (Aug. 1997). The Long Island Sound Comprehensive Conservation
and Management Plan sets interim targets, with a minimum of 3 mg/l under cenain conditions. CCMP, supra note 2, at 26.
22. CCMP, supra note 2, at 15.
23. HYPOXIASTUDY,supra note 20, at 10. Hypoxia can be especially damaging for organisms, such as oysters, which cannot move to more oxygen enriched waters. Id. Hypoxia can
also alter the ecological makeup of a waterbody, wiping out organisms sensitive to low oxygen levels, while allowing those types of organisms which can sustain themselves in such
conditions to survive. Id 1 n addition to hypokc conditions resulting from their decay, algae
cloud the water, depriving submerged aquatic vegetation, so important to many species for
food and habitat, of the light necessary for growth. Alliance for the Chesapeake, N m Air
Rules Expecfed to Help R e d m Bay Nutrients, BAYJOURNAL,
July-Aug., 1997, at 10.
24. The hypoxia problem caused by excessive discharges of nitrogen is exacerbated by the
natural tendency of the waterbody to stratify during the warmer summer months. The
fresher water on the surface is warmer but contains more oxygen than the lower layer, which
is denser and saltier. This phenomenon creates a density difference called a pycnocline.
which prevents mixing of the surface and bottom layers which would otherwise occur and
bring oxygen to the lower level. CCMP, supra note 2, at 1618; s u infia note 313 and accompanying text.
25. CCMP, supra note 2, at 11.
26. CCMP, supra note 2, at 20. Nitrogen compounds in the air result from emissions by a
variety of sources, and are deposited to water bodies directly either as dry deposition, or acid
precipitation. They reach waters indirectly through runoff. Estimates on the amount of nitrogen reaching the Sound through these mechanisms vary. The LISS estimates the figure
at 11 percent. Phase I11 Proposal, supra note 21, at 5. A report released by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in June 1996 contains an estimate of 20 percent. R VALICURA,
W. LUKE,R ARTZ, B. HI-.
COASTAL OCEAN PROGRAM,NATIONAL
OCEANICAND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINLSlXATION, DECISION
ANALYSIS
SWES NO. 9, ATMOSPHERIC
NUTRIENT
INPUT TO COASTAL AREAS: REDUCING THE UNCERTAINTF.~17 (1996). Sec ako Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA453/R-97-011, Deposition of Air Pollutants to the Great Waters: Second Report to Congress,
168,17374 (1997) (total load from atmospheric deposition is 20 percent).
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day of treated effluent discharged by over 60 sewage treatment
.~
more than half
plants located on or close to the ~ o u n d Indeed,
of the total load of nitrogen delivered to Long Island Sound as a
result of human activities is from these plants.28 These discharges,
as well as other point and nonpoint loadings of nitrogen have increased over the years, and will likely continue to do so.''
B.

Addressing the Problem

Sewage treatment plants are required under the Clean Water Act
to employ a specific level of treatment referred to as "secondaly
treatment,"g0and even more stringent controls if necessary to prevent the impairment of local waters." Although some incidental
nitrogen removal occurs during normal operations, most plants are
not designed to remove significant levels of this pollutant. Achieving high levels of nitrogen removal requires construction of new
facilities or costly upgrades of old ones. Even with new technology
based on biological
the costs are s~bstantial.~~
The Long Island Sound Management Conference, a partnership
27. CCMP, supra note 2, at 4; LISS, SUMMARY
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
CONSERVATION
AND
M A N A G ~ E NFTU N , at 6 (1994) [hereinafter CCMP SUMMARY].
28. CCMP, supra note 2, at 20. The most recent figures indicate that point sources, primarily sewage treatment plants, account for 37,000 tons of nitrogen a year. PHASEI11
PROPOSALS,
supra note 21, at 5.
29. Nonpoint sources conmbute substantially less nitrogen to the Sound than point
sources, -roughly twenty percent CCMP, supra note 2, at 20. Because of their diffuse nature it is often difficult to monitor, measure and control their pollutant load. Additionally,
they are almost unregulated under the Clean Water Act. Scc infia note 172.
30. Clean Water Act 5 301 (b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b) (1) (B). Sce infra note 179.
31. Clean Water Act 5 301 (b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b) (1) (C).
32. Nitrogen removal was traditionally achieved by using chemical additives. Biological
methods for removing nutrients from wastewater (BNR) have improved the economic outlook, but still can be quite costly, and cannot always be employed. PHASEI11 PROPOSAL,supra
note 21, at 6; sccCCMP, supra note 2, at 29.
33. Preliminary estimates indicated that total maximum capital costs for a high level of
nitrogen removal from point sources to the Sound could be as much as $8.1 billion, $6.4
billion for New York and $1.7 billion for Connecticut. CCMP, supra note 2, at 158. The
most recent cost estimate for maximum nitrogen removal at the 70 treatment plants in New
York and Connecticut is about $2.5 billion. PHASEI11 PROPOSAL,
supra note 21, at 14. Scc
ah0 AT. KEARNEY, INC., FRAMEWORK FOR INCORPORATING FLEXIBLE,MARKET-BASED
INCENIWES
INTOGEOGRAPHIC
TARGETING OF N ~ O G EREDUCI'ION
N
ACTIONSFOR LONGISLAND
SOUND, DRAFT FINAL 1-6 (August 27, 1996) [hereinafter AT. KW\RNEY, INC.], [prepared for
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Region 11] (estimates are in the $2 to 3 billion
range). It should be noted, however, that these estimates reflect the total cost of plant u p
grades, and not just the incremental costs of adding nitrogen removal. Incremental costs
have recently been estimated at $300 million for New York and $350 million for Connecticut. PHASEI11 PROPOSAL, supra note 21, at 14.
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of the federal government and the states of Connecticut and New
York which was established by Congress to oversee the Long Island
Sound Study and to develop a Comprehensive Management plan",
issued its Plan in 1994.'~ In it, the Conference chose both interim
and long term goals for dissolved oxygen levelss6 and set forth a
phased implementation plan to manage hypoxia, focusing on sewage treatment
Phase I essentially called for a "freeze" on
nitrogen loadings, setting 1990 as the baseline year.
Phase I1
consisted of a number of relatively low cost actions to achieve additional reductions below 1990 levels. The Plan recognized that
these steps would not meet the interim targets, let alone the overall
goal for dissolved oxygen ands9accordingly, Phase 111 called for additional reductions, with targets to be based on sophisticated computer modeling work.
To carry out the Phase I11 reductions, the near Sound watershed
was divided into geographical management zones, based primarily
on tributary watershed^.^' Nitrogen loadings in each zone and
their impacts on the Sound were to be assessed based on the
model, and zone-by-zone plans would be fashioned to achieve nitrogen reduction targets,'" using both point and nonpoint source
34. Set s u p note 19.
35. The Conference released the Management Plan in 1994; the principal problems it
idendfied were (1) low lkvels of dissolved oxygen (hypoxia) in muchof the Sound, due in
large pan to nitrogen from point sources, primarily sewage treatment plants; (2) toxic contamination; (3) contamination from pathogens; (4) floatable debris; (5) the impact of all
these factors on living resources; (6) and the degradation of water quality and habitat due to
land use and development. CCMP, supra note 2, at ES1.
36. Id. at 25, 26 (Sidebar 5). The CCMP set interim DO targets both for the bottom waters of the Sound where the greatest problems occur, and for surface waters. The intent of
the targets is to eliminate severe hypoxia. Bottom targets are to maintain existing DO levels
in those waters currently meeting state water quality standards; and raise DO levels to meet
state standards in those areas having current DO levels between 3.5mg/l and the state standards. For those areas which do not presently achieve a level of 3.5mg/l, the interim target
is to increase levels to 3.5 mg/l, with an absolute floor of 1.5 mg/l at all times. Interim targets were also established for surface waters. The long term
is to "[ilncrease dissolved
oxygen levels in the Sound to eliminate adverse impacts of hypoxia resulting from human
activities." Id. at 25.
37. Id. at 2745.
38. The states agreed to achieve this 'freeze," through various permit modifications and
facility retrofits. CCMP, supra note 2, at 27-29
39. Id. at 36.
40. The land area was classified into eleven "management" zones, corresponding largely
to river system watersheds. The function and intent of these management zones and plans,
and their significance to any proposed trading program, is discussed in Part VI, infia.
41. CCMP, supra note 2, at 37.
-
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controls.. But in light of the high point source loadings and the difficulties inherent in reducing runoff: a substantial focus remained
on limiting sewage plant discharges.
Subsequent to the issuance of the report a new computer model,
known as LIS 3.0, was completed for use in managing nitrogen
loadings to the ~ound." Based on modeling work, it appears that
to achieve targeted dissolved oxygen levels overall inputs of nitrogen must be reduced 58.5 percent from 1990 levels. Accordingly,
in Februaxy 1997 the LISS Management Conference's Policy
committee4' released for public comment a "Proposal for Phase 3
Actions for Hypoxia Management", which included a commitment
by Connecticut and New York to reduce nitrogen loads by 58.5
percent from 1990 levels by the year
The proposal contemplates a phased, enforceable schedule which is to achieve 40 percent progress toward the 58.5 percent goal in five years; 75 percent
within ten years; and full attainment in 15 years.46 Each of the
eleven watershed-based management zones established by the LISS
was allocated the same 58.5 percent reduction." Within each management zone loadings may be allocated to both point and nonpoint sources.
42. According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) nonpoint sources are
today the largest cause of our Nation's water quality problems. O ~ C OF
E WATER,U.S.
P R O T E ~ I OAGENCY,
N
EPA A841-F-964044, NONPOINT
SOURCE
POLLUTION:
ENVIRONMENTAL
THE NATION'SLARGFS WATERQUALITY PROBLEM,
Pointer No. 1, (visited Dec. 20, 1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/NPS/facts/pointl.htm>. These sources are extremely diverse, set i d , and are harder to idennfy and control than point sources, depending as they do
on localized features such as land uses, climate and geology. See David Letson,
Point/Nmp0IPOIntSource Pollution Reduction Trading: An Inlnpretive Survey,32 NAT. RESOURCES
J.
219 (1992). Monitoring and enforcement are-also mor; difficult for these diffuse sources.
Id at 2.
43. LIS 3.0 is a threedimensional(east-west, north-south, surface to bottom) time-variable
model combining both the hydrodynamics of the Sound with water quality components. It
uses tide and current measurements to simulate the water's circulation. HYDROQUAL,
INC.,
MODELING
ANALSIS OF HWXIA IN LONGISLAND
SOUNDUSINGLIS 3.0 Uuly
WATERQUAL~Y
1996) (prepared for the Management Committee, Long Island Sound Estuary Study gnd
New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Commission).
44. The Policy Committee, which is composed of the Administrators of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's Regions I and 11, the New York State Commissioner of Environmental Consenation, and the Connecticut Commissioner of Environmental Protection,
has overall responsibility for the LISS. CCMP, supra note 2, at 5-6,and Figure 2.
45. The states will propose Clean Water Act permit modifications and commit to necessary nonpoint source actions by August 1999; the nitrogen reduction targets are to be
achieved 15 years after that date. LISS Policy Committee, Proposal for Phase 3 Actions for
Hypoxia Management, February 7, 1997 [hereinafter Policy Committee Proposal].
46. Id. at 2.
47. Id at 1.
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The Policy Committee further proposed to assure that its actions
in administering and enforcing the nitrogen reduction targets
would be consistent with the Clean Water Act by formally develop
ing a total maximum daily load (TMDL) for nitrogen as required
by the Act, including both point and nonpoint sources. Once a
TMDL is established, the states will develop zone-by-zone plans to
allocate the wasteload or wasteload reductions among dischargers."
By 1999, wastewater discharge permits will be modified to reflect
the allocations? and commitments made toward nonpoint reductions by 1999. The Policy Committee's proposal was the subject of
public meetings in the fall of 1997 and it was adopted in final form
in February 1 9 9 ~ . ~ "
In the meantime, interest has been expressed by Long Island
Sound officials in the potential for employing market mechanisms,
such as a point source nitrogen' trading program, to achieve the
necessary reductions at the lowest overall cost. The Long Island
Sound Study Management Conference released in August 1996 a
Framework for Incorporating Flexible, Market-Based Incentives into Gee
graphic Tawting of Nitrogen Reduction Actions for h g Island Sound,
Draft ina ah^' The document analyzed the benefits and drawbacks of
trading and recommended a specific "strawman" trading program
for the Sound. In its February 1997 proposal, the Policy Committee appointed an Ad Hoc Nitrogen Trading Discussion Group consisting of federal, state and local officials, academic^,^' and environmental public interest representatives to review the issue and
report by June 1998 regarding the feasibility of a nitrogen trading
program. It is the proposal for trading on Long Island Sound that
is the ultimate subject of this article, but to fully understand the issue some understanding of the basics of pollutant trading and its
history is e~sential.~'
48. The TMDL process is discussed in Pan IV,infia
49. The proposal contemplates that NPDES permits will be modified to require plans for
meeting the long-term limits, and to impose nitrogen loading limitations in accordance with
the five-year target. Policy Committee Proposal, supra note 45,at 2.
50. LISS Policy Committee Meeting Summary, Feb. 5, 1998, at 1;John T. McQuiston, 15Year Plan Is Adopted To Clean L.I. Sound, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 1998,at B4. In spite of the commitment to reducing hypoxia in the Sound demonstrated by the proposal, there remains a
real likelihood that even if all scheduled reductions are achieved, the goal of substantially
improved oxygen levels may remain elusive. &PHASE I11 PROPOSAL,
supra note 21,at 9.
INC., supra note 33.
51. AT. KEARNN,
52. The author is a committee participant
53. For further information regarding Long Island Sound see Ann Powers and E1.i~S.
Andreas, h g Island Sound: A Bibliography of Legal and Related Materials, 14 PACEENVFL.L.
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111. THEELEMENTS
OF A TRADING PROGRAM

Pollutant trading is a market-based approach to environmental
protection intended to take advantage of the differences in pollution control costs confronting dischargers of the pollutant in question. The theory is to allow those dischargers that can achieve pollution reduction most cost effectively to sell or barter their excess
pollutant reduction capabilities to other eligible dischargers for
whom reducing their own pollutant loads is more costly. By this
process, the more efficient pollution reduction sources profit financially, while the less efficient sources take the regulatory credit
for the reductions." Trading seeks to inject a large degree of flexibility into a pollution control program by separating the issue of
who will pay for the control from who will install it.55 In this manner it addresses the complaints of rigidity and inefficiency which
arise in the traditional regulatory programs.56
REV. 447 (1996). A full listing of federal environmental law statues and related authorities
may be found on the Pace V i d Environmental Law Libmy. S u Pace University School of
Law, Center for Environmental Legal Studies, Global Environmental Law Neb&
<http://www.law.pace.edu/env/vell6.html>.
54. Su Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incmtivc-Based Environmental Regulation: A
N m Era F m an Old Idea, 18 ECOLOGYL.
Q. 1 , 8 9 (1991) [hereinafter Hahn & Stavins, Incmtive Base-Environmental Regulation]; TOMTIETENBERG,
EMISSIONS
TRADING: AN EXERCISE
IN
REFORMING POLLUTION
POLICY 16 (1985) [hereinafter TIETENBERG,
EMISSIONS
TRADING];
Paul Faeth, What is Trading?I 1 , in Summaly of Aesentaths, Water Quulib Trading Confmenu
(Surface Water Quality Division, Michigan Department of Environmental Quality) (visited
December 20, 1997) <http://www.deq.state.mi.us/swq/trading/htm/confsum.htm>
[hereinafter Faeth, Whot is Tradingq.
55. S u TOM RETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL
AM) NATURAL RESOURCE
ECONOMICS410
(1992) .
56. SugmeraQ, Ackerman & Stewart 1985, supra note 12; Breger et al., Providing Economic
Incentives in Environmental Regulations, supra note 13; Richard B. Stewart, ModcLc/or Environmental Regulation: Cmtral Planning V
.Ma&-Based Approack, 19 B.C. ENVTL.AFF.L. REV.
547, 554 (1992). The term "command-andcontrol" is often used, sometimes negatively, to
describe traditional pollution control regulations which give specific directives to dischargers concerning the level of control to be achieved or the &pes of technology to be installed.
Su Hahn & Stavins, Inccntivc-Baud Environmental Regulation, supra note 54, at 56. Professor
Driesen argues that the term 'command and control" is usually used inaccurately to refer to
regulatory measures which specify emission levels, notjust precise compliance methods. See
Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Gnnmand and Control/Economic IncentiveDichoknny, supra note 14, (manuscript at 9-12). Whatever its flaws, even
those who criticize it as inefficient concede that a traditional regulatory approach may be
preferable in certain situations, such as when pollutants have local impacts, or where the
sources are too few to provide a competitive market. Hahn & Stavins, supra note 54, at 1 4
15. In Hahn's and Stavins' view, the best set of pollution control policies will involve a mix
of market mechanisms and traditional regulatory measures. Id at 15. Sec also infra note 180
(discussingof technolowbased standards).
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A.

Market-Based Principles

The goal of a pollutant trading program is to attain ecological
objectives while effectively lowering overall discharge control costs.
To attain this goal, trading programs must rely on the basic elements found in every market: a commodity to be traded, a demand
for the commodity, and a.structure in which, trading can occur.57
In a pollutant trading scheme, pollution discharge units are the
commodity that is traded. These units represent a defined amount
of pollution expressed in'terms of kilog&s, pounds, or tons? and
are typically referred to as credits or a l l o ~ a n c e s .Since
~ ~ the goal is
to protect environmental resources, the tradable units must be real
and quantifiable to assure that actual pollutant reductions are
a~hieved.~'
Once the trading program has been established, potential cost savings are the primary economic incentive that will create
demand. A discharger will be inclined to trade if the trade allows it
to reduce its cost of pollution control, but if cost savings are unavailable, trading is unlikely to o ~ c u r . ~Generally,
'
a discharger
would have incentive to purchase units if it could thereby achieve
the required pollution reduction at a price .below its own control
costs. .On the other hand, a discharger would have incentive to sell
if its control costs were low and it could profit by generating excess
saleable pollution reduction units.62Finally, the structure of a trading program (the rules of the game or the trading guideline) is
likely to be determined, especially i n t h e water pollution context,
.

,

57. See Kurt Stephenson & Leonard Shabman (Virginia Water Resource Research Center), Efluent A h a n c e Trading: A New Approach to Watmhed Management, WATERSCIENCE
REPORTER2 (National Institutes for Water Resources), Oct, 1996 [hereinafter WATER
SCIENCE REPORTER].
58. See Introduction to Market-Based Programs, supra note 17, q 3.
59. Whether these units are called credits or allowances depends upon the nature of the
trading program. See infia note 66.
60. See Introduction to Market-Based Programs, supra note 17,q 3; Breger et al., Aoviding Ece
nmnu Incentives, supra note 13, at 471.
E WATER,U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION
AGENCY,PUB. NO. EPA
61. See O ~ C OF
800-R-96-001, DRAFTFRAMEWORKFOR WATERSHEDBASED
TRADING (1996) [hereinafter
DRAFTW E W O R K ] . Optimally, all sources would control to the same marginal cost level,
that is, the additional o;incremental costs of achieving one additional unit of pollution reduction would be equal. See Hahn & Stavins, supra note 54, at 6 & n. 25.
62. Sac Hahn & Stavins, supra note 54, at 6 & n. 25; TIETENBERG,
EMWIONS
TRADING,supra
note 54, at 16; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Pmnits: Lcssmfo~Thcoly and
Pradice, 16 ECOL. L. Q. 361,364 (1989) [hereinafter Hahn & Hester, Mankctable Permits]; Esther Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Source Troding: Looking Bqrofld Potential Casl Savings, 23 ENVTL.L.
43,5657 (1993) [hereinafter Bartfeld, Point-Nunpo1'nt Suurce Trading].
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through negotiations between the dischargers, government permitting authorities, and interested citizen groups.a
B.

Types of Markets

One of the first considerations in establishing a trading program
is to determine the type of "market" which will be created, since
that will dictate how units of pollution reduction will be created
and how new sources can gain entry into the market. Trading programs are either structured as open or closed, and both can take
place in an existing regulatory f r a r n e w ~ r k . ~
An "open" market
program has no cap on the overall amount of pollution discharged, or limit on the number of pollution units which may be
traded.65 A baseline generally is established by a regulatory program, and a source in the system creates saleable reduction units
(credits)&by reducing discharge levels more than necessary to
achieve its permitted baseline level. 67 The credits may be traded,
used for compliance or banked. A source wishing to sell credits
can do so after documenting that it has in fact reduced its discharge below the regulated mandated levels. The trading program
is "open" to new sources, in that the only barrier into the market is
compliance with the regulatory requirements, usually use of specified technological controls or attainment of the performance level
which might be achieved using those controls. 68 Accordingly,
sources meeting these requirements do not need to purchase credits to begin operation.69
Because open-market trading systems are based upon existing
discharge limits without a cap, they may require little additional
63. Sec WATERSCIENCE
REPORTER,supra note 57, at 413.
64. Scc Faeth, What ir Tmding?, supra note 54; Introductirm to Market-Based Program, supra
note 17, 11 7-10. Virmally all uading programs rely on an existing permitting system.
HAHN, supra note 11, at 50.
65. One example of an open market type trading arrangement, the use of offsets under
the Clean Air Act, is examined below in Pan 11. C. 3.
66. These terms are often used interchangeably, but 'credits" tend to refer to the excess

pollution units created in an open program by reductions below the baseline. 'Allowance"
is the term usually used when referring to the pollution units allocated in a closed program.
67. SccFaeth, What ir Trading?,supra note 54. The baseline for reduction for an open uading program comes from the exishng regulatoly framework, 'such as existing te;hnology
based standards expressed in individual discharge permit.
67. See id
68. Participation in the program is voluntary, without resuiction on the number of participants.
69. &AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 2-9.
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environmental information and monitoring, and permits need not
generally be issued or altered. Thus, this type of program lends itself to relatively prompt implementation. But because credits can
be used by dischargers to meet the baseline requirements, there is
substantial possibility for localized impacts, or "hot spots."70
An "open" trading program is not really feasible for Long Island
Sound, since the Clean Water Act requires any water body which is
not meeting water quality standards (e.g., the Sound) to have a total
limit on loadings as discussed in Part IV, A. However, understanding this type of market is necessary when reviewing other trading
programs.
Although open trading programs may have appeal because of
their apparent flexibility, closed trading programs, generally referred to as "cap and trade," are the most common. The acid
deposition control provisions of the Clean Air Act are of this nat ~ r e , ~as' well as all of the existing water pollutant trading programs.n
In a closed trading program the sources which are subject to the
program are specified by statute, regulation or other mechanism."
A regulatory agency or other entity sets a cap, fixed or declining,
on the amount of pollutants that a watershed, air shed or ecosystem may absorb.74 Once this cap or baseline is set, dischargers are
allocated a specified number of pollution units (allowances), and
will produce a surplus of credits or allowances when they reduce
their pollutant loads below the a l l ~ c a t i o n .These
~~
surplus pollution units may be traded with other sources in the program, or may
be "banked" for future use. . No allocations are made for new
sources, which must purchase unused allowances to gain market
entry." In this way, new sources will not affect the total aggregate
limit placed on the pollutant of concern.77 These concepts are
70. See Introduction to Ma&-Based F'rograms, supra note 17, 1 9. Because of the relatively
unregulated nature of open programs, and the possibility of hot spots, it is unlikely that the
Environmental Protection Agency would allow open trading to address water pollution. See
D w FRAMEWORK,
supra note 61, at 24.
71. Clean Air Act 5 402,42 U.S.C.§ 7651.
supra note 61, at Appendix C.
72. DM FRAMEWORK,
73. See Faeth, What is Trading?, supra note 54, 1 2; Introd~utionto Market-Based Aograms,
supra note 17,11 7-10.
74. Faeth, What is Trading?, supra note 5 4 , 1 2 .
75. Seeid
76. &AT. KWU(NEY, INC., supra note 33, at 2-10.
77. See id. at 2-9. The Drap Framnuak does not use the open-market/closed-market terminology. However, EPA's Trading Principle 3 enunciates that states must establish TMDLs

Heinonline - - 2 3 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 5 2 1 9 9 8

19981

Reducing N i t r o g e n P o l l u t i o n

153

somewhat confusing in the abstract, but an exploration of trading
under the Clean Air Act will help in gaining a clearer understanding of how they work in practice.
C. Trading Experience Under the Clean Air Act
The first large scale pollution trading program was undertaken
pursuant to Title IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, the
acid deposition control provisions.78 Other sections of the Act also
allow trading in some fashion, and merit examination. Some of
these predate the acid deposition provisions, and provided early
experience in market mechanisms. These early trading mechanisms are bubbles, netting, offsets, and banking.rJ By examining
each, the potential cost savings and environmental impacts of emission trading can better be understood.

1.

Bubbles (regulation of existing sources)

Under the Clean Air Act a single facility may be composed of
numerous emitting units or "sources," each subject to individual
controls. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) introduced
regulatory flexibility into this situation through a "bubble" policy
which allows existing plants (or groups of plants) with multiple
emission sources to be treated, for regulatory purposes, as a single
s o u r ~ e .Once
~
the Agency has approved a bubble, provided the
total emissions limit is met by the plant, it may vary source emissions within the facility as it desires. 81 The bubble policy was u p
where technology-based limits are insufficient to protect water quality, at required in section
303(d)of the Clean Water Act. Scc infia notes 190-197and accompanying texc 33 U.S.C. 3
1313. In such cases it appears that an open-market system would be unavailable. Scc DRAFT
FRAMEWORK,
supra note 61,at 2-6.
78. SccClean Air Act 55 410416.42 U.S.C. $5 7651i-76510(1994).
79. Scc LIROFF,Ton. & TROUBLE,supra note 13,at 39;Robert W. Hahn and Gordon L.
Hester, WhereLM All the Markets Go? An Analysis ofEPA's Emissions Trading Aogram, 6 YALE
J.
ON REG. 109, 118136 (1989)[hereinafter Hahn & Hester, W e Did All fhe Markets Gol];
Hahn, Doctor's Or&, supra note 13,at 9899;Hahn & Hester, MarketabIc Permits. supra note
62,at 368376;Daniel J. Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is thir Thoroughbred
Hobbled?, 13 COLUM.
J. E m . L. 217,223229 (1988)[hereinafter Dudek & Palmisano, Emirsionr T ~ a d i n d .In its review of the various pollution control methods available to policy
makers the Oflice of Technology Assessment characterized bubbles and netting as integrated permitting rather than trading since they deal with pollution transfers within a single
facility, and not between facilities. See ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICYTOOLS,s u p note 11, at 108.
80.EPA, Emissions Trading Policy Statement General Principles for Creation, Banking,
and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814,43,830 (1986)[hereinafter
EPA Emissions Trading Policy].
81. Id SccLtROW, TOIL & TROUBLE, supra note 13, at e,
Hahn & Hester, WhenDid All fhe
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held by the Supreme Court in Chamm v. NRDC," but remains controversial because under the policy some sources escape othexwise
applicable technology requirements, and other sources have on
occasion been manipulated to avoid stricter emission standards,89
with potentially adverse environmental consequences. Nonetheless, the deferential standard articulated by the Court when reviewing EPA's construction of the Clean Air Act provisions certainly has
relevance as the Agency develops pollutant trading policies under
the Clean Water ~ c t . ~
2.

Netting (modification of existing source)

Netting is a concept similar to a bubble, but is employed when a
major emitting source under the Clean Air Act undertakes a modification resulting in increased emi~sions.'~If there are other units
or sources within the same facility which can reduce emissions to
compensate for the new emissions caused by the modification, certain preconstruction permit requirements can be a~oided.'~Netting is the most frequently employed method of trading by a wide
margin. It has been calculated that some 8,000 sources used netting between 1974 and 1984: with an estimated saving of $25 to
$300 million in permitting costs, in addition to $500 million to $12
billion saved in emission control costs,88although the accuracy of
Markets'Go?, supra note 79, at 12329.
82. 467 U.S.837 (1984) (a landmsk opinibn which held that i h e r e the legislative intent
of a statute is ambiguous, the court must grant great deference to the interpretation of the
agency).
83. Sec LIROFF,TOIL& TROUBLE,
s u p a note 13, at 98-99; David M. Driesen, Is Emirsirms
Trading a n Econmnic Incentive Rugram?: @lacing the Gnnmand and Control/Economic Incentive
Dithobmy, supra note 14, (manuscript at 39). Hahn & Hester, Where Did AU thc Markets Go?,
supra note 79, at 123. EPA policy does not allow emission reduction.from existing sources to
meet technology based requirements applicable to new or modified s t a t i o n q sources. EPA
Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 80, at 43,830. Through 1985, EPA had only approved
42 bubbles under the Act. See Hahn & Hester, W e Did AU the Markets Go?, supra note 79, at
123. However, state-permitted bubbles, available in a few states, had been created on a more
frequent basis. Id at 137.
84. For an example of the "bubble" concept used in the water pollution control context
see Part IV, B, 4.
85. EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 80, at 43,830.
86. Id See m o m , TOIL& TROUBLE,supra note 13, at 6; Hahn & Hester. W e Did All the
Markets Go?. supra note 79, at 132-136.
87. Sec Hahn & Hester, W e Did AU the Markets Go?, supra note 79, at 133. he authors
point out that netting could have an adverse impact on local air quality if several sources in a
single area utilized this method of wading. Sec id at 136.
88. Sec i d at 138, Table 4.
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these types of figures has been questioned.89Both bubbles and netting apply to existing sources within the same facility or under the
same ownership. The next category, offsets, apply more generally
to new sources.

3.

Offsets (new sources)

Under the Clean Air Act, new major emitting units or sources
seeking to emit pollutants in areas where air quality is impaired
may only do so if the total load of pollutants to the environment is
not increased. To accomplish this, new sources are required to
"offset" their anticipated emissions by finding an existing source
able and willing to reduce by the same, or a greater, amount.''
This offset can be achieved through internal trades between emission sources within a single facility or external trades with another
entity.g1 Offset provisions essentially create an open market in
which the regulatoxy limitations placed on sources to attain National Ambient Air Quality Standards for the traded pollutant are
used as individual baselines for sources engaging in trades, but
there is no overall numerical cap. Over 2,000 offsets transactions
occurred between 1977 and 1986, however, external trades accounted for only a small percentage of the offsets.= This may result from a lack of "readily identifiable" sellers, and subsequently
higher transaction costs to find suitable trading partners.93 As for
environmental impacts, at least some commentators have concluded that although offset transactions may not protect air quality
as effectively as possible in all instances, they have not had a significant negative impact on environmental

89. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Inuntivc Aogram?: R@lacing the
Command and Gmhol/Econmic IncmtivcDichotomy, s u p note 14, (manuscript at 3334).

90. EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 80, at 43,830-831. The offset policy originally developed by EPA was subsequently adopted by Congress in various provisions of the
Clean Air Act amendments of 1977. See, cg.,' Clean Air Act 5 173(c), 42 U.S.C. 5
7503(c) (general); Clean Air Act 5 182(a) (4), (b) (5). [cl(10), (d) (2), & (e) (1). 42 U.S.C. §
751la(a) (4). (b) (5). [c] (lo), (d) (2), & (e) (1) (ozone nonattainment).
91. EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 80, at 43,830-831. Scc LIROFF,
TOIL&
TROUBLE,
supra note 13, at 6-7; Hahn & Hester, Whcrc Did All the Markets Go?, supra note 79,
at 119123.
92. Scc Hahn & Hester, WhcrcDid All the ManActr Go?, supra note 79, at 119120.
93. Scc id at 122.
94. Scc id; Dudek & Palmisano, Emircimrr Trading, supm note 79, at 122-23.
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4.

Banking

A fourth mechanism under the Clean Air Act, banking? allows
firms to store credits for future use or sale,%but it has not been
particularly effective." A credit bank can also be used as a market
place in which credit buyers and sellers can be located at a minimal
transaction cost. However, banking activity has been nearly nonexistent as banks have not effectively promoted trading, nor have
firms deposited many credits. Hence, banking has had a de minimis effect on air quality and cost savings. It has been suggested
that two factors may be responsible for this inactivity. First, firms
find little use for banks in attainment areas, which have no offset
requirements. The utility of banked credits is further diminished
by other restrictions which may limit the use to credits to only offset or internal application. Secondly, the uncertain nature and
value of banked credits explains the dearth of banking activity.
Banked credits may be reduced or eliminated by a change in regulatory policy. Limited credit-life also raises the possibility that credits may disappear prior to an opportunity for their use.''
5.

Title IVAcid Deposition Control Program

The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act brought about a major change in the manner of dealing with acid deposition by creating an emission trading program for sulfur dioxide
The
program, known as the "Title IV program," seeks to reduce the
emissions of sulfur dioxide from electrical utilities by setting an
overall cap on SO, emissions and creating a scheme of tradable
emission a l l o ~ a n c e s . ' The
~
trading provisions are a free standing
95. EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 79, at 43,831.
96. Su LIROFF,TOIL& TROUBLE,
supra note 13, at 7;Hahn & Hester, Where Did AU Lhc Mark& Go?. supra note 79, at 129-132;EPA Emissions Trading Policy, supra note 79, at 43,831.
97. Hahn & Hester, WhereDid AU flu Mark& Go?, supra note 79, at 119,130-131,137.
98. Set id
99. Sec Pub . L. 101-549, title IV,5 403, 104 Stat. 2589 (Nov. 15, 1990) (codified as Clean
Air Act 5 403,42 U.S.C. § 7651b).
100. Clean Air Act 5 403, 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b (1995). The amendments also address another pollutant implicated in acid deposition, nitrogen oxides (NOx), but not through an
allowance trading program. Instead, performance standards are required, although there is
some allowance for averaging between uniu with the same owner or operator. clean Air Act
5 407(c), (e), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651f (c), (e)(1995). EPA has promulgated regulations which allow a state or group of states to establish a cap and trade program for NOx under defined
circumstances, 40 C.F.R. 5 76.16 (1997), and is developing a model NOx trading rule. 62
Fed. Reg. 54,409 (1997). The 1990 amendments did include a directive to the Adminisuator to evaluate and report to Congress by 1994 on the environmental and economic consc
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program, separate from the general design of the air pollution
control program based on national ambient air quality standards
carried out through state implementation plans. Under this
"closed" trading program, a specified group of utilities received initial allocations of tradable allowances based on an annual tonnage
emissions formula set forth in the statute.lO' Utilities which reduce
their emissions below allocation levels may sell the excess allowances; if a utility emits more that the allowances it is allocated, it
can remain in compliance by purchasing additional allowances
from other electric generating units or the EPA which holds a limited number of allowances for auction.lWThe Title IV program has
two-phases, the first of which became effective in 19951°3 and a p
plies to 110 utility plants specified in the Clean Air Act, most of
which are large, coal-fired Midwestern power plants.'04 Phase 11 will
regulate approximately an additional 700 utility plants after January 1, 2000.1°5
While the commentators are not uniform in their assessments of
the program, three observations summarize the Title IV program
to date. The first is that SO, emission reductions thus far have exceeded present Clean Air Act requirements. Second, the cost of
this compliance has been below that which was projected. Finally,
quences of trading sulfur dioxide allowance for nitrogen oxides allowances. Clean Air Act §
403(c), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(c)(1995). The 1990 Clean Air Act amendments also greatly expanded the number of instances where emission trading or other market-based control concepts may be used. See, e . ~ Clean
,
Air Act §§ 607, 616, 42 U.S.C. 7671f, 76710 (1995)
(chlorofluorocarbon trading); Clean Air Act
211(k) (7) (A), (m) ( 5 ) , 42 U.S.C. §
7545(k) (7) (A), (m) (5) (reformulated gasoline credits; marketable oxygen credits for fuels);
Clean Air Act 5 246(f), 42 U.S.C. 7586(f) (1995) (centrally fueled fleets). See also Hahn &
Stavins, Inwntivc Based-Environmental Regulation, supra note 54, at 22 n.136.
101. Clean Air Act 5 403(a), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(a) (1995); Acid Rain Program: General
Provisions and Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, Excess Emissions and Administrative Appeals, 58 Fed. Reg. 3590 (Jan. 11, 1993); 40 C.F.R Parts 72, 73,
75,77 & 78 (1997).
102. Clean Air Act 5 403(b), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(b) (1995). EPA is a vendor of what are
designated Special Reserve Allowances, representing 2.8 percent of the annually allocated
allowances. Clean Air Act 416(b), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651o(b) (1995).
103. Clean Air Act 55 404,405,42 U.S.C. $5 7651c, 7651d.
104. See Clean Air Act 5 404, Table A, 42 U.S.C. 5 7651c Table A (1995); U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING
OFFICE,GAO/RCED9530, AIR POLLUTION:
ALLOWANCE
TRADINGO m AN
OPPORTUNI'IYTO
REDUCE EMISSIONS
AT LESSC O S 16 (1994) [hereinafter GAO, ALLOWANCE
TRADING]; David Sohn and Madeline Cohen, From S n w R c s to
~ Spcciw:Extending the Tradoblc
P m i t Approach From Air Pollution tu Habitat Cmrcmatirm, 15 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 405, 422-23
(1996) [hereinafter Sohn & Cohen. Smokcshch].
105. &Clean Air Act 5 405,42 U.S.C. 5 7651d (1995); GAO, ALLOWANCE
TRADING,supra
note 104, at 16.
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there has been very limited allowance trading activity.Io6
Overall, the Title IV program appears to have led to a sharp reduction in SO, emissions in the first years of operation. In a 1997
report, the Environmental Protection Agency indicated that for
1996 all of the sources covered by the law were in compliance with
their emission limitations, either through actual emission reductions or by the purchase of allowances. Moreover, SO, emissions
were 5.4 million tons, 2.9 million tons (35 percent) below Title IV's
maximum level^.'^' It is suggested that the reduction in emissions
resulted in decreased sulfate deposition in the Northeast, with corresponding increases in benefits to human health.'08 From an environmental standpoint, because the targeted reduction of SO, emissions for Phase I has already been exceeded, terming the allowance
trading program a present success would not be inaccurate.
As to the second point, Title IV compliance has been achieved at
costs well below those that were projected. An indicator of the
costs of reducing SO, emissions is the price of the allowances themselves. Despite early predictions ranging between $300 to $1000
per ton of SO, reduction, the average price of an allowance during
1996 was less than $100 per ton,''' and has dipped to as low as $68
per ton.'1° However, judging the actual cost savings due to trading
is difficult for several reasons. First, while the proponents of trading point to these figures as a sign of the cost effectiveness of the
program, it is obvious that some of the disparity between estimates
and current costs stems from inflated estimates used by industry to
oppose the program."' Second, although increased flexibility in
106. See GAO, AU.OWANCE TRADING, supra note 104, at 4, 25, 27; Byron Swift, The Acid
Rain Test, 14 ENVTL. FORUM: THEPOUCY JOURNAL OF THE ENVTL. L. INST. NO. 3 16
(May/June 1997) [hereinafter Swift, Acid Rain Test];Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New
Standard of P e r f m n c e : An Ana4si.s o f h e Clean Air Act5 Acid Rain Program, 26 E m . L. REP.
( E m . L. INST.) 10411 (1996); Sohn & Cohen, Smokestach, supra note 104, at 424-426.
AGENCY,
107. &? OFFICE OF AIR AND RADIATION, U.S. ENVIRONMENTALPROTECTION
EPA/43@R-97-025, 1996 COMPLIANCE
REPORT: ACID RAIN TRADING PROGRAM7 (1997)
(visited Apr. 15, 1998) <'http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/cmprpt96/crl996.hml">
[hereinafter 1996 COMPLIANCE
REPORT].
108. Seeswift, Acid Rain Test, supra note 106, at 17.
109. Sec Swift, Acid Rain Test, supra note 106, at 22. The working assumption at the time
of passage was that costs would be in the $1000 a ton range. Gregory Wetstone, Crmgressional
Effmts to Eradicate Environmental Laws, 14 PACEE N v n . L. REV. 123,124 (1996).
110. EPA, 1996 COMPLIANCE
REPORT, supra note 107, at 10. The price of an allowance
may not indicate the actual cost of a ton of emission reduction today, but instead may reflect
the long-term scarcity value, or marginal cost. Swift, Acid Rain Tat, supra note 106, at 22.
11 1. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissim Trading an Economic Incenlil~eProgram?: @lacing the
Command and Gmtrol/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, supra note 14, (manuscript at 42); Mat-
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control options may contribute to the decrease in compliance
costs, the drop has been greatly aided by reduced rail costs which
have encouraged utilities to switch to lower sulfur western coal, and
also by reduced costs of improved scrubber technologies.112Plus,
the demand for additional allowances has been suppressed. This is
primarily attributed to the large quantity of surplus emission allowances, which keep the price at relatively low levels.113The resultant
excess allowances are being saved ("banked") for future compliance needs.l14 Finally, although the program has reduced the overall cost of complying with C.A.A. requirements, it has not reached
expected levels. Factors which may have impacted this result include transaction costs.l15
Title IV has been characterized by sparse allowance trading activity; in most cases trading has not been used to achieve compliance
even in instances where the potential for significant cost savings is
apparent."= The General Accounting Office reported that only
three percent of Phase I utilities planned to use allowance pur-

thew L. Wald, Acid-Rain Pollution Credits Arc Not Enticing Utilities, N.Y TIMES,
June 5, 1995, at
A l l ("indusuy executives picked high numbers in effort to dissuade Congress from imposing stricter standards"). See also Jim Bradley, Buying Htgh, Selling Low, E/THE ENVIRONMENTAL MAGAZINE,July-Aug. 1996, < http://www.emagazine.com/2curr3.html>,fi 6.
112. ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW IN^, IMPLEMENTING
AN EMISSIONS
CAPAND ALLOWANCE
TRADING !hXll% FOR GREENHOUSE
GASES:bSONS FROM THE ACIDRAIN PROGRAM 2-3 (1997)
[hereinafter ELI REPORT]; Professor Driesen concludes that the low cost of controls may
result from conditions that would have produced the same results in a traditional regulatory
program. David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading a n Econmnic Incentive Program?: @ k i n g the
Command and Control/EconomicImtiveDichotmny, supra note 14, (manuschpt at 41-42). 113. See David M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incmtive Program?: Replacing the
Command and Control/EconomicIncmtiveDichotomy, supra note 14, (manuscript at 41-42); Sohn
& Cohen, SmoRestacRr, supra note 104, at 425; GAO, ALLOWANCE
TRADING, supra note 104, at
27.
114. GAO, ALLOWANCE TRADING, supra note 104, at 2526.
115. Id at 25,5355. In the only study to explore the prospective costs versus the benefits
of the Title IV program, researchers at Resources for the Future found that the expected
benefits, mainly in reduced mortality risk, will substantially outweigh the compliance costs to
electric utilities. DALW BURTRAW,
ALAN KRUPNICK,
ERIN MANSUR,DAVIDAUSTIN,AND
DEIRDRE
FARRELL,THECOSTS AND BENEFITS
OF REDUCING
ACIDRAIN2 (Discussion Paper 9731-REV) (1997).
116. Scc Sohn & Cohen, SmoRcrhckr, supra note 104, at 425426; GAO, ALLOWANCE
TRADING,supra note 104, at 3. The picture is not totally negative on trading activity. EPA
data indicates that there was a doubling of the volume of allowances traded (between organization not counting internal trades) from 1995 to 1996, and a second doubling from
1996 to 1997. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Acid Rain Rogram: Trading Activity
Ere*:
Cumulative Graphics (visited Apr. 15,1998) <http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/ats/
qlyupd>.
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chases as a major means of achieving compliance.1i7The dearth of
trading activities seems to be a result of a combination of factors.
First, the two-phase design of the program unwittingly separates the
natural sellers of allowances (e.g. the largest emitters) from the
natural buyers (e.g. smaller plants which are not subject to Phase I
regulation) until the year 2000.'18 Additionally, price confusion
and a scarcity of price information make it difficult for a company
to assess the market accurately.'1gThis is compounded by the tendency of the utility industry to be risk-adverse and conservative, in
part because of the impact which government regulation may have
on its profit margins.i20 Moreover, interstate trading is resisted by
some states which oppose the transfer of allowances from in-state
facilities to out-of-state facilities located upwind."' Nevertheless, a
number of observers express belief that trading will increase as the
market matures and as the more stringent requirements of Phase I1
take effect.ln
117. GAO, ALLOWANCE
TRADING,supra note 104, at 27.
118. See Swift, Acid Rain Test, supra note 106, at 22; Sohn & Cohen, Smokestach, supra note
104, at 426; -0, ALLOWANCE
TRADING,supra note 104, at 4.344.
119. &Swift, Acid Rain Tat, supra note 106, at 22; Sohn & Cohen, Smokestach, supra note
104, at 426427; GAO, ALLOWANCE
TRADING,supra note 104, at 5358.
120. See Sohn & Cohen, Smokestach, supra note 104, at 427; GAO ALLOWANCE
TRADING,
supra note 104, at 43,4547. Utilities are also concerned that EPA regulations may be issued
for other pollutants which will affect compliance options. Id. at 5.

Other impediments to trading cited by the General Accounting Office include problems
with the design of EPA's auction, the manner in which allowances are treated for capital
gains tax purposes, and lingering environmental concerns. GAO, ALLOWANCE
TRADING,
supra note 104, at 43.
121. See Deborah M. Mostaghel, State Reactions to tlw Trading of Emissionr AUowances Under
Titlc IV of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 22 B.C. EWL. AFF. L. REV. 201, 207 (1995)
[hereinafter Mostaghel, Sta& Reactions]. New York filed suit against EPA to prevent New
York-based utilities from trading allowances to utilities in the Midwest, id at 208 (citing New
York v. EPA, No. 93-1214 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar 12, 1993)), and the legislatures of New York
and Wisconsin were contemplating bills to prohibit emission allowance mdes to upwind
facilities. See id at 209-10. See alro Alliance for Clean Coal v. Miller, 44 F.3d 591 (Tb Cir.
1995) (striking down Illinois Coal Act); See alro Bradley, supra note 111, 111-12. These and
other states have enacted laws to control acid deposition, which may be used to regulate inuastate trading. See Mostaghel, State Reactions at 211. Also, states which produce highsulfur
coal may restrict trading to protect their coal industries. See id. at 214. Mostaghel contends
that these types of regional controls could deter interstate allowance trading by making trading cumbersome and interfering with Tile W s free-market approach. See id at 224.
122. See, e.5, Swift, Acid Rain Tat, supra note 106, at 17. We should also consider the impact that deregulation of the utility industry might have on the future of the trading program. It is possible that properly structured competition and technological advances will
take many old plants out of use, leaving a huge surplus of unwanted allowances. Conversely,
closure of nuclear plants, coincident with a spurt in demand brought on by lower electric
prices and a rise in gas prices might mean a very tight market for sukur dioxide and a spun
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In spite of apparent progress made under Title IV in reducing
emission, concerns still exist. The banked emission allowances are
likely to reach the 10 million ton mark as the tighter limits of Phase
I1 take effect, therefore, many years may pass before the allowances
are exhausted and the more stringent emission levels actually have
an impact. If this simply means that we are enjoying the benefits of
early reductions, and will eventually reach the targeted goals, then
well and good, especially if money has been saved in the process.12s
But questions have been raised as to whether allowances have been
accurately calculated and assigned, and to what extent they might
not represent real reductions.12* The distributional issue is a troublesome one; a citizen living in the shadow of a smokestack may
not take comfort in the overall cost efficiency when told that the
plant, instead of reducing its emissions, will exercise the option of
purchasing allowances from afar.'=
If we accept the Title IV program as a success, there are several
elements which arguably contribute to its effectiveness, and ought
to be included in any pollutant trading program. Obviously, a
clear baseline must be established from which trades can be made,
and it must reflect an adequate level of protection for the environment. Of paramount importance to a trading program is a
thorough and effective monitoring requirement.'26 Without this,
in trading.
123. However, one observer noted that '[ilf Congress was striking a balance between environmental toughness and financial mercy, it could have required tougher standards for
the amount it had agreed to make utilities spend." Wald, supra note 111, at A1 1.
124. The formula which Congress dictated for allocating allowances was based on historical fuel consumption which may have been higher than a given facility's current usage, thus
creating unearned "paper credits" which did not reflect actual pollution reductions. In addition, utilities were allowed to earn credits when they achieved reductions that they were
otherwise mandated to carry out by technology based requirements. SeeDaniel A. Seligman,
Sierra Club, Air Pollution Emissions Trading: Opportunity or Scam? A Guide for Activists 16
(1994). The original allocations specified in the statute therefore grandfathered much pollution, and contained "politically inspired exceptions," which sewed "special interests at
public expense." ELI REPORT, supra note 113, at 35. In addition, special bonus provisions
for such items as early cleanup tended to enlarge the number of allowances banked. Id
125. It is worth noting that the NOx reduction program also resulted in substantial reductions in its first year through traditional emission limitations, with averaging by commonly
owned units. All units subject to the NOx requirements in 1996 were in compliance with
applicable emission limitations, and total emissions declined 33 percent from 1990 to 1996.
Sec EPA, 1996 COMPLIANCE
REPORT, supra note 107, at 12,14,16.
126. Scc ELI REPORT,supra note 112, at ii. Facilities subject to Title IV must install, maintain, and report the results from a continuous emission monitoring system (CEMS). Clean
Air Act 3 412(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a) (1995). If for some reason monitoring data is not
obtained, the facility may be deemed to be operating in an uncontrolled fashion during the

Heinonline - - 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 161 1998

there can be no assurance that trading units represent actual pollution reductions. Key elements of Title IV are the enforcement provisions, and the substantial noncompliance penalties.'57 Finally,
there is a publicly available allowance tracking system that should
foster compliance and enforcement.lS
Despite the minimal trading activity,.the program is still generally regarded as having spurred a reduction in current emission
levels. At least one commentator has suggested that even if little
reduction in costs or innovation in controls result from a trading
program, a well-designed.program may be worthwhile because it is
politically effective in reducing opposition to control^.'^^ This
comment may be applicable beyond the Title IV program.

6.

EPA's Lead Phasedown Program

Before concluding our examination of air pollution related trading programs, an additional effort in this area merits attention: the
program employed by EPA to eliminate lead as a gasoline additive.
To reduce the high levels of airborne lead, EPA in 1982 inaugurated an "inter-refinery averaging" program allowing gasoline refiners to trade rights to use lead additives.lW Under the program,
refiners were permitted to trade lead content allowances which
were proportionate to the amount of lead added to the gasoline
being produced. These allowances could be deposited in a "bank"
for a period of up to three years. The program was characterized
by an active trading market, with over half of all refineries making
trades."' The result was a program which dramatically reduced
and eventually eliminated the use of lead in gasoline, apparently
with substantial cost efficiency.'32
entire period for which data is not available, and penalized accordingly. Clean Air Act 5
412(d), 42 U.S.C. $7651k(d) (1995).
127. Clean Air Act Section 411(a) establishes a penalty of $2000 a ton for excess emis-.
sions. 42 U.S.C. 5 7651j(a) (1995). In addition, the facility must offset the excess emissions
by an equal amount in the next calendar year. Clean Air Act 5 41 1(b), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651j(b)
(1995).
128. &Clean Air Act 5 403(d), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(d) (1995).
129. David M. Driesen, Five h n s f i o r n the Cleun Air Act Imphuntation, 14 PACE E ~ LL..
REV. 51.58 (1996).
130. 40 C.F.R 5 80.20(d) (1988) (expired Jan. 1,1986) EPA,Regulation of Fuel and Fuel
Additives, 47 Fed. Reg. 49,322 (1982) (expired, 50 Fed. Reg. 13,116 (1985)). For a full description of the program see Hahn & Hester, Marketable P m i t r , supra note 62, at 380-391.
131. Hahn & Stavins, Inuntiuc Based-Environmental Regulation,supra note 54, at 17; Hahn
& Hester, Marketable P m i t s , supra note 62, at 384-391.
132. Hahn & Hester, Mankctable Pmnits, supra note 62, at 380-391.
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Commentators point to several factors which they assert made
this program a success. First, the program had a clear goal: elimination of lead in gasoline, as well as a fixed end.'" Second, transaction costs were relatively low and trading was easy to monitor because the market participants were a small and homogeneous pool
of refiners who had previously traded refinery product amongst
themselves. Added to that, creation of the allowance bank provided additional flexibility and resulted in a significant increase in
trading activity. Finally, the program had a. simple regulatory
framework which lacked burdensome restrictions such as credit
certification or trade approval requirements.'" While this led one
author to single out the program as coming closest to the economist's ideal,lS5 the actual market driver seems to be the eventual
ban, which suggests that a traditional phasedown program might
well have achieved the same re~u1ts.I~~
~v.
EPA's DRAFTWEWORK
FOR WAT~RSHED-BASEDTRADING

A.

In General

The experience in emissions trading under the Clean Air Act,
along with a growing interest in pursuing market based pollution
reduction measures, spawned efforts to adapt the lessons learned
thus far to water pollution controls. In 1996 the Environmental
133. SeeHahn,Doctor's Ordm, supra note 13, at 10243.
134. Seed
135. HAHN, supra note 11, at 41*,
Hahn, Doctmk &dm, supra note 13, at 101. See David
Trading an Economic Incentive Rogram?: @lacing the Command and
M. Driesen, Is EmGmtrol/Econonic Incmtiue Dichotomy, supra note 14, (manuscript at 39).
136. An additional trading program worth noting is the Regional Clean Air Incentives

Market (RECLAIM) which allows for the allocation and trading of emission credits among
firms in Los Angeles, emitting nitrogen oxides (NO,) and sulfur oxides (SO,). The
RECWM program is administered by the South Coast Air Quality Management Disuict
(SCAQMD), which oversees federal and state air legislation for the Los Angeles area. The
number of credits annually allocated by SCAQMD diminishes each year in order to facilitate
reducing NO, and SO, emissions by a set percentage. Credits are typically swapped at semiannual credit auctions or over the Internet. Trades must be recorded by SCAQMD, but do
not require prior approval or public input.
While the RECWM trading market was sluggish shortly after its inception in 1994, it has
become quite active. The cost of emission reduction has been lower than that anticipated
under a command-andcontrol regime, as the price of credits continues to fall. The large
number of firms, in addition to the simple regulato~yframework and the various forums for
trades, keeps transaction costs low. See Sohn & Cohen. Smokestack,supra note 104, at 430432
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Protection Agency (EPA) published a Draft Framework for Watershd-Based Trading, which is essential to understanding the regime
within which a water pollutant trading program must operate.lg7
The Draft Framework does not, however, provide an adequate analytical basis either for evaluating the legal aspects of 'a proposed
program, or forjudging its economic and administrative aspects.
The Agency's goal, as expressed in the Draft Framework, is "to assure that trading programs are designed to provide flexibility with
accountability as well as incentives to trade" within the existing
framework of federal, state and local governmental statutes and
regulations.198The DraJt Framework encourages innovation in meeting water quality goals, yet supports only those trades that adhere
to water quality requirements set forth under the Clean Water
~ c t . ' ' ~Moreover, EPA spells out clearly in the document that it
"will not depart from its enforcement and compliance responsibilities under the C W A . . . [and] [tlrades that depend on fundarnental changes in EPA's enforcement and compliance responsibilities
will not be a l l ~ w e d . " ' It
~ does not, however, analyze how various
trading schemes might or might not comport with the requirements of the Act and regulations.
The Draft Framework recognizes five different kinds of trading,
two of which are most relevant to proposals being put forth for the
Sound. The first, "point/point," occurs when one point source attains greater than required pollutant reductions, and trades those
reductions to another point source which cannot achieve its required pollution reduction."'
The second type of trading,
"point/nonpoint," trading occurs where a point source arranges
for a nonpoint source to undertake best management practices
(BMPs) to reduce polluted runoff in lieu of performing plant u p
grades.142Currently the type of trading being discussed for Long
137. See D m WEWORK,
supra note 61. The document is intended to "a framework
on how best to implement the Clean Water Act and EPA's regulations to facilitate pollutant
trading in watersheds." 'Id at iv. In actuality, there is very little discussion of the details of
srruc&ng programs which meet legal requirements. The Draft Framework is also intended
to provide information on how EPA intends to exercise its discretion in implementing its
regulations. The Agency asserts specifically that the Draft Framework is not a regulation,
and is not legally binding. Id
138. Sec id at i.
139. Sec id. at xi.
140. Id
141. Set id at xv.
142. Sec id. The three other types of trading are "intra-plant", 'pretreatment", and
'nonpoint/nonpointn. The most suaightfonvard, intra-plant, occurs when a facility has sew
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Island sound is point/point, with the possibility of point/nonpoint
left open for future c~nsideration.'~~
In the DraJ Frameumk, the Agency has further spelled out general
principles which it believes a trading scheme should follow in order to comply with existing laws and regulations for attaining water
quality.

B.

The Framework's Principles

Although EPA has defined in the DraJ Frameumk eight separate
principles'Mto guide pollutant trading, to some extent, significant
overlap exists and they may effectively be consolidated and restated
as four principles. First, trades must occur within constraints of the
Clean Water Act. Specifically, point sources must meet technologybased standards established under the Act; the trades must be consistent with attainment of water quality standards, including the
processes used to implement the standard^;"^ trades must occur in
the context of current regulatory (i.e., permitting) and enforce146
ment mechanisms; and they must include public participation."'
era1 permitted outfalls and is allowed to shift pollutants from outfall to outfall, so long as the
combined permitted discharge with trading is not greater than without. Id. at xv, 52. Pretreatment refers to the program requiring industries which discharge to publicly owned
sewage treatment plants to 'pretreat" their wastes prior to discharge in order to avoid interfering with the' sewage plant's operations or causing pollutants to pass-through the plant
without adequate treatment. See Clean Water Act 5 307(b), 33 U.S.C.5 1317(b) (1994). In
a trading program the sewage treatment plant arrange with the pretreater to undertake
greater than required reductions in its pollutant discharge to the plant, in lieu of the plant
performing upgrades of its own system. Sec DRAFTFRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at xv, 61.
Nonpoint/nonpoint trading occurs where one nonpoint source ananges for BMPs at another nonpoint source in lieu of installing or upgrading more expensive BMPs at its own
site. See id. at xv, 8-1.
143. SeekT. KEARNN, INC., Supra note 33, Exhibit 44, at 4-20. For an interpretive survey
of the research into and the practical experience with point/nonpoint trading, in which the
author concludes that its time has not yet come, see Letson, Point/Non@'nt Source Pollution
supra note 42. See also Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint h r u
Reduction Trading: An Interpretive Su-,
Trading, s u p note 62 (may offer cost-effective control alternative in limited number of waterbodies).
144. & D m WEWORK,
supra note 61, at 24.
145. Technology-based standards and water quality standards are discussed in Pan IV, in-

fin.
146. S e e D m FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 2-7.
147. EPA expresses strong support for the role which stakeholders play in ensuring environmental protection and assem that stakeholder involvement and public participation are
key components of trading. Trading is envisioned as a partnership decision that brings the
regulators, the regulated, and the public together to form a solution to water quality p r o b
lems. It is viewed as a way to build alliances between stakeholders and to educate the general
public. Ultimately, trading with stakeholder involvement is a way of promoting local solu-
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Second, trading boundaries should generally coincide with watershed or waterbody segment boundaries to ensure that the environmental consequences of trades between parties occur in the
same waterbody or strearn/river segment.148Boundaries should be
of manageable size and should be selected to prevent localized
problems.149Third, trading should generally result in increased water quality monitoring to assure that trading is not having an adverse environmental effect.15' Fourth, EPA requires that careful
consideration be given to the types of pollutants traded, and discourages trading of toxics,151or of one pollutant for another.'52
Of these four categories, a nitrogen trading program on Long Island Sound would appear on its face to satisfy the second and
fourth principles; the trading program boundaries match the g e e
graphic boundaries, and only one pollutant (nontoxic) is involved.
As to the third category, since point sources are primarily involved,
there is already an established, if not necessarily sufficient, monitoring system.153Beyond that, considerable monitoring and modeling has been in order to establish the yearly loadings, which, barring funding cutbacks, should continue. This should help to
provide the technical information essential in determining whether
trading is adversely affecting water quality in the Sound. The remaining category, compliance with the existing regulatory program
will be discussed in Part IV.
tions to local problems. See id at 2-10-11: Encouragement of citizen participation and placebased-programs are key themes in current Agency activities. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY,EPA/190-R-97402, EPA
STRATEGIC
PLAN 13,20,29,50,83-84 (1997).
148. DRAFT W E W O R Ksupra
,
note 61, at 28.
149. Id.
150. Id at 2-9.
151. Toxics present special problems since localized "hot spots" may present risks to both
human health and the environment. Toxics are also often persistent in the environment,
and accumulate in the foodchain. Set Robert I. Fassbender, Redm'ng Great L.aka Toxics: Can
WeDo Morefor Less Through WastezuaterEfluent Trading?, 1 Wis. Envtl. L.J.57, 83 (1994). The
author recognizes that technology standards would have to be attained, and suggests that
trading could take place in the process of implementing water quality standards. Id at 84.
See also Alexandra Teitz, Assessing Point SOUTCC
Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study in Controlling Selenium Discharges to the San Francisco Bay Estuaty, 21 Ecology L.Q. 79, 95 (1994) (only
reductions beyond what is required by technology based-standards could be traded).
152. S~DRAFTW E W O R Ks, u p note 61, at 2-9. This principle is not a ban on toxic pollutant trading, but ensures that toxic trading is given considerable thought. Additionally,
this principle is not a ban on 'cross-pollutant" trading, but EPA does not believe such trades
are possible under the current regulatoly framework. Therefore, all trades likely will involve
the same pollutant. Id at 2-9-10.
153. See40 C.F.R 3 122.48.

Heinonline - - 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 166 1998

19981

Reducing Nitrogen Pollution

167

Since its publication in May 1996, the Draft Framework has been
assaulted by environmentalists and the regulated community
alike.'" Environmentalists are validly concerned with the fact that
the Draft Framework does not assure maintenance or improvement
of water
They seek a ban against trading among different
watersheds and want to limit point/nonpoint trading until nonIndustry,
point source reduction is enforceable under the CWA.'~~
on the other hand, is calling for just the opposite, arguing that the
Draft Framework is too restrictive and in need of greater flexibility.15'
Due to these complaints the Agency is unlikely to issue a final version of the Framework in the near future, thus the draft will continue to provide the best indication of EPA's approach to proposed
water pollution trading programs such as the one being considered
for Long Island sound.15'

Barring congressional changes, a nitrogen trading program on
Long Island Sound must take place within the wellestablished
framework of the Clean Water
including the goals of achieving fishable/swimmable waters and eventually eliminating the dis154. & EPA May ScaIc-Back Gmfrovmial Efluent Trading Framcluork, INSIDEEPA, January
24, 1997, (Weekly Report), at 7; WATER
ENVIRONMENT
FEDERATION
(WEF), COMMENTS
ON
D m FRAMEWORK FOR WATERSHEDBASED
TR~ING
September
,
9, 1996, on file with U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, Comment Clerk, Water Docket MC-4101. These comments may also be found at the Federation's website, (visited Apr. 15, 1998)
<http://www.wef.org/docs/uade.commenu.html~.
155. &INSIDE EPA, supra note 153. at 7.
156. Sierra Club, Comments on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, September 11, 1996; National Wildlife Federation, Comments by the National Wildlife Federation
on the U.S.E.PA's Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, September 11, 1996.
These comments are on file with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Comment
Clerk, Water Docket MC-4101. The full text of comments received by the Agency as of December 1996 may be found at <http://www.epa.gov/~~~~/watershed/&adecom.html~
(visited Apr. 15, 1998).
157. & WEF, Comments on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, supra note
154.
158. & EPA S h s E f f i to Esh6hh Clean Water Act Tradinghgram, Inside EPA, Sept. 12,
1997, (Weekly Report), at 11.
159. The present statuto~yframework was enacted in 1972 as the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA) Amendments. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972). FWPCA was
substantially amended by the Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95217, 91 Stat. 1566
(1977), which provided that T h i s Act may be cited as the 'Federal Water Pollution Control
Act' (commonly referred to as the Clean Water Act)." The Clean Water Act (Clean Water
Act) appellation will be used in this article. The Act has been amended several other times,
most significantly by the Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987).
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charge of pollutants into the Nation's waters.lbO
The Act essentially
prohibits the discharge of pollutants'61into our Nation's waters unless done in conformance with a federal or state permit under the
National Pollutant Elimination Discharge System (NPDES).16'
Standards are established to govern the issuance of permits, along
with a regulatory scheme for implementing the program.'69 That
scheme includes enforcement mechanisms,lMand the opportunity
for citizen input.'= In contrast to the Clean Air Act, there are no
explicit provisions in the Clean Water Act for pollution trading.'66
Moreover, there is a clear requirement both to meet health-based
water quality standards and to apply maximum technological controls,'" with few opportunities to take cost into account.'68 But if
160. Clean Water Act 5 101,33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1),(2).
161. Clean Water Act § 301,33 U.S.C. § 1311. The term "discharge of pollutants" means
the addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source. Point source is defined to generally encompass pipes and other 'discrete" conveyances, but not runoff. Clean
Water Act 5 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); set supra note 18. Navigable waters is defined in
the Act as waters of the United States, Clean Water Act 5 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7), and
further defined in EPA regulations to include all waters susceptible to use in interstate or
foreign commerce. 40 C.F.R 122.2. When enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress stated
that it fully intended "that the term navigable waters be given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation." House Consideration of the Conference Committee, October 4,
1972, reprinted in 1972 Legislative History 251 (1973) (statement of Rep Dingell, a principle sponsor of the bill). &United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985).
162. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. 5 1342. The NPDES system focuses on point
sources; with limited exceptions, such runoff from industrial sites or the streets of larger cities, nonpoint source pollution is essentially unregulated under the Act. &Clean Water Act
§ 402(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p).
163. Congress recognized the important role of the states in water quality protection, see
Clean Water Act 3 101(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(b), and provided for delegation of the wastewater discharge permit program to the states. Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
164. Clean Water Act 8 309, 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (government enforcement); Clean Water
Act § 505.33 U.S.C. § 1365 (citizen suits).
165. Scc, e.g., Clean Water Act 8 402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. 8 1342(b)(3) (public notice and
hearing on proposed permits).
166. EPA regulations do allow limited internal facility trading, or bubbling, for iron and
steel manufacturing point sources, but not if the resulting discharge would violate applicable water quality standards. 40 C.F.R 5 420.03.
167. Under the Act, increasingly stringent technology controls are imposed over time,
forcing the development of new technologies. See Clean Water Act 5 301 (b), 33 U.S.C. 5
1311(b).
168. Consideration of costs can play a limited role in establishing technology standards
under the Act The total cost of best practicable technology (BPT) controls must not be
'wholly disproportionate" to the benefits, Chemical Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 870
F.2d 177 (5" Cir. 1989); Weyerhaueser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Clean
Water Act 55 301(b)(l)(A), 304(b)(l), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b) (b)(l)(A), 1314(b)(l), and
the costs of controlling conventional pollutants by industry and sewage treatment plants
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these important strictures are met, room for trading within the
confines of the Act still exists.I6'
The necessity of complying with an existing regulatory program
complicates, but does not preclude, a trading program. Any emissions trading program must generally be based on some type of
pollution abatement regulato~yprogram designed to control emissions. In general, that control may either be exerted directly
through emission standards, or indirectly through technology requirements.'" Under the Clean Water Act, emission limitations
embedded in the NPDES permit can serve as the trading benchrnarkl7' and the flexibility inherent in the TMDL process allows
trading to be used as one method of a l l o c a t i ~ n . ' ~
In analyzing the provisions of the Clean Water Act which affect a
trading program it is useful to focus on four areas: standards (both
for technology and water quality), permits, enforcement, and citizen participation.

should be comparable. Clean Water Act 55 301(b)(2)(E), 304(b)(4), 33 U.S.C. $5
13ll(b)(l)(E), 1314(b)(4). Cost is one of the factors which may be taken into account in
setting best available technology (BAT), 55 301(b)(2) (A), (C), (D), (E), 304(b)(2), 33
U.S.C. 55 l311(b) (2)(A), (C), (D), (E), 1314(b)(2), and standards of performance for new
sources, Clean Water Act 5 306(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1316(b) (1) (B), but only to determine
whether the standards are economically achievable. Sw Rybachek v. EPA. 904 F.2d 1276 (9*
Cir. 1990).
169. Water quality standards and technology controls arguably reflect two different regulatory philosophies; the former has been described as economically based, the latter as ethically based. 2 W. RODCERS,ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW: AIR & WATER5 4.1, at 12-16. Water quality standards assume that water may legitimately be polluted to a "reasonable" extent in
order to achieve an economic good. The 'moralist" view, on the other hand, would hold
pollution as fundamentally wrong, and favor maximum limitations on pollution. Sw id The
Federal Water Pollution Control Act originally adopted water quality standards as its control
mechanism, but the dismal history of accomplishment led Congress to adopt technology
based controls in the Clean Water Act as a more practical method of achieving the statutes
goals. Since 1972 it has been the national goal to reduce the discharges of pollutants to the
Nation's waters to zero. Clean Water Act 5 101(a) (1), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a) (1). Scc also
E m . LAW INST., CLEAN
WATER
DESKBOOK9 & n. 98 (1991) (discussion of regulatory consequences of philosophies).
170. TIETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL
AND NATURAL
RPSOURCE ECONOMICS,
supra note 55, at
410. Sec also HAHN, PRIMER,
supra note 11, at 50.
171. Id.
172. The statute and regulations dictate how the TMDL must be established, but are silent
as to allocation. Clean Water Act 5 301(d)(l)(C), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d)(l)(C); 40 C.F.R §
130.7. Another area of flexibility relevant to a trading program arises in regard to nonpoint
sources. The Act deals with this type of pollution through planning mechanisms and voluntary programs, not under the regulatory provisions. Sec Clean Water Act 55 208, 319, 33
U.S.C. 55 1288, 1329. This provides substantial room to shape -ding programs dealing
only with nonpoint sources, and leeway in designing point/nonpoint trading.
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A.

Standards

To achieve the goal of protecting the Nation's waters, Congress
established two types of standards under the Clean Water Act, both
of which must be employed in issuing discharge permits under the
NPDES program. The first are the so-called technology standards,
which control how much pollutants may be discharged by various
categories of dischargers.'" The second are water quality standards, which dictate the level of pollutants that may be resent in a
water body without impairing the quality of the water.' ' Both are
used to establish final effluent limitations for a discharger.175

P

1. Technology Based Standards
Technology based categorical effluent standards form the backbone of the Clean Water Act. Technology based means that the
discharger must achieve the same pollutant reduction levels as can
be attained using a specified technology. 176 These standards are
devised by the EPA as national discharge limits for various categories of industrie~"~
and must be complied with regardless of the
quality of the receiving water.17' In the case of sewage .treatment
173. SecClean Water Act 55 301,304,306,33 U.S.C. 5 1311,1314,1316. These standards
may only be waived under certain narrowly defined circumstances. Sw Clean Water Act $5
3ol(g)-(i), (k), (m), (n), & (p), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311 (g)-(i). (k), (m), (n), & (p).
174. Sec Clean Water Act § 301 (b) (1) (c), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b) (1) (C); Clean Water Act 5
303,33 U.S.C. 5 1313.
175. Clean Water Act § 301(b) ( I ) (C), 33 U.S.C. § 301(b) (1) (C).
176. Although based on a specific technology, this is a performance standard.
177. &Clean Water Act §§ 304(b), 306, 33 U.S.C.§§ 1314(b), 1316. Effluent limitations
are generally specified in permits in terms of both mass and concentration, although federal
regulations require only the former. Sec 40 C.F.R § 122.45(f). At least one author has suggested that concentration limits inhibit a trading program, see Teitz, Assessing Point SUUTCC
Discharge Permit Trading: Case Study in Gmtrolling Selenium LXschatges lo the San Frantisco Bay
E s f u a ~supra
~ , note 151, at 105106, but they are extremely important ecologically since they
dilute the discharges and prevent high loadings in a short period of time from acutely degrading water quality.
178. Sec Clean Water Act 5 301 (b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1)(C); EPA v. California,
426 U.S. 200 (1976). The Act originally required sources other than sewage treatment
plants to apply the 'best practicable control technology", or BFT, Clean Water Act §
301(b) (1) (A), 33 U.S.C. 5 301 (b) (1) (A), but BPT was largely superceded by more stringent
standards. Existing sources other than publicly owned sewage treatment works must now
apply 'best conventional pollutant control technology (BCT)" to conventional pollutants
such as biological oxygen demand, suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH. Clean Water
Act § 301(b)(2) (E), 33 U.S:C. § 1 3 1 l ( b ) ( 2 ) ( ~ )Clean
;
Water Act 5 304(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. §
1314(a)(4). Toxics and nonconventional pollutants must be controlled by the 'best available technology (BAT)." Clean Water Act § 301 (b)(2)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (2)(A); su
Clean Water Act 5 304(b)(Z)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(Z)(A). New dischargen must meet
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plants, the applicable technology standard is called "secondary
treatment,"Imand it is the general standard for treatment plants.
Although a requirement that minimum technology -levels be
achieved may reduce' the market scope in a trading program to
some extent,Is0it provides a national uniformity and a minimum
even more stringent standards of performance. &Clean Water Act 5 306(a) (I), 33 U.S.C. 5
1316(a)(1).
179. Clean Water Act § 301(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b) (1) (B); su Clean Water Act 5
304(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(d). Sewage treatment plants typically are designed to treat the
types of pollutants found in human waste, which include biochemical oxygen demanding
pollutants (BOD) such as nitrogen, along with suspended solids(SS), and pH. Secondary
treatment is defined by EPA regulations as a removal rate of at least 85% for BOD and SS;
the 3May average may not exceed 30 milligrams/liter, and the 7day average may not exceed 45mg/l. 40 C.F.R. § 133.102(a),(b). The pH of the discharge must be between 6.0 and
9.0.40 C.F.R 5 133.102(c).
180. & Elise Fulstone, E $ w t Trading: Legal Constraints on the Implnnmtation of MarketBared E $ m t Trading Program Under the Clean Water Act, 1 Envtl. Law 459, 474, 47880
(1995). The author identifies what she considers to be a number of obstacles to effluent
trading imposed by the Clean Water Act's current regime. Regarding the technologicalbased requirements of the C.WA, she asserts that they limit the amount of pollutant load
available for trading and the numbei of trading participants, thereby reducing the potential
for cost-savings. She argues that national standardsare not costefficient because they ignore
local environmental variables, and that variances should be allowed so that dischargers
might meet their individual technology based effluent limitations through trading. Id at
47880. & also Ackehan & Stewart 1988, supra note 12, at 1335-40. Thisview reflects a
negative view of technology-based standards that is not necessarily shared by all who have
analyzed the issue.
Environmental regulatoly schemes generally use one of three approaches to redressing
pollution problems. They have been described as harm-based standards, technology-based
standards, or individualized cost-benefit analysis. Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the N m C h n Air Act, 21 E m . L. 1647, 1659-60 (1991) [hereinafter
Latin, Regulatoly Failure]. Harm-based standards require the regulatory agency to determine
what level of environmental impact is acceptable, and to impose whatever controls are necessary to achieve that level. &, e.g., Clean Water Act § 307, 33 U.S.C. § 1317. Technologybased standards instead require a certain level of technological control to be imposed, without being linked to the environmental result of the controls. &, r g . , Clean Water Act §
301(b) (2)(A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b) (2)(A). A cost-benefit analysis approach may involve
both. &Latin, Regulatory Failure, supra While harm-based standards may appear to be more
likely to result in achievement of environmental goals, in actuality they have had limited
success. They are difficult to establish and administer, and often lead to inaction on the part
of regulatory officials. Technology standards, while presenting difficulties of their own, are
more administmtively feasible, and thus more likely to be employed and enforced. Id at
1662-63. Technology standards are especially important in a national program since they
decrease the likelihood that indusaies will attempt to locate in areas with lower environmental standards or create "pollution havens." & Howard Latin, Ideal v m Real Regulatoly
E f f i : Implementation of U n i f m Shndardr and Fine-Tuning' Regulatory Ref-,
37 STAN.L.
REV. 1267, 1271 (1985). Other advantages noted by Professor Latin include greater consistency and predictability of results, increased likelihood that regulations will withstand judicial review, and decreased information collection and evaluation costs. Id
Cost-benefit approaches also present problems in implementation, and may overly empha-
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level of control that has long been. a key consideration under the
AC~.'" In addition, as stated by the Agency in explaining its inclusion as the first of the principles .in the DraJ Frameworft, technology
standards also promote fairness by allowing only those sources
which have already met a baseline contribution to water quality
protection to benefit from trading.'''
In the case of the Long Island Sound, the question of technology-based standards may not present significant difficulties, since
most of the entities which discharge substantial quantities of nitrcl
gen, and would thus be eligible to participate in a trading program,
are sewage treatment plants. The technology required of these
plants is secondary treatment, and all of the plants on the Sound
now meet that requirement.'83 However, the Clean Water Act requires that if technology-based limitations are not sufficient to prevent a facility's discharges impairing the quality of the receiving water, the permitting authority must develop more stringent effluent
limits (referred to as water quality-based effluent limitations) for
size the cost side of the equation. They also fail to consider noneconomic values which have
important social consequences. .See Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGaxity, Not So Paradoxicat The Rathale Fur T e c h m b ~ B a s e dRegulation, 1991 DUKEL.J. 729 (1991) (discussing
the Occupational Safety and Health Act).
181. While Congress has employed harm-based standards and cost-benefit analysis in pollution statutes, there has been a continuing shift to technology-based strategies. Congress'
disenchantment with the use of harm-based water quality standards under the Clean Water
Act led to wholesale revisions in the Act in 1972, which now relies substantially on technology standards, with water quality standards essentially serving as a backstop. Scc Oliver A.
Houck, Of Bats, Birdr and BA-T: The Convergent Evolution of Enuinmmenhl Law, 63 Mrss. L.J.
403 (1994).[hereinafter Houck, BAT]; Latin, Regulaloty Failure, supra note 180, at 1660-61.
Scc a h supra note 168. For a detailed discussion of the weaknesses of the water quality standards program see ROBERTW. ADLER,JESSICAC.LANDMAN,DIANEM. CAMERON,
TNE CLEAN
WATERACT:
20LATER119-128 (1993).
The requirement that all water discharges meet a national engineering standard (BAT)
has been described as 'a great innovation in environmental law,' "a radical, indeed an heretical approach at the time.. . ."SccHouck, BAT, supra note 181, at417.
182. D m FRAMEWORK,
supra note 61, at 24. A similar view was expressed by Professor
Robert W. Adler when discussing the difficulties inherent in point/non-point trading. After
noting that nonpoint sources are not subject to minimum controls, as are point sources, he
continued, "Arguably trading will work best as an economic incentive after minimum controls are imposed on all sources, so that trading proceeds from a position of equity among
potential uading partners." Scc Robert W. Adler. Economic Incmtiverfi Wetlands and Water
Qualily hotation: A Public PerspcCtiue 15, American Bar Association Section of Natural Resources. Energy and Environmental Law, 26&Annual Conference on Environmental Law,
March 1315, 1997. Environmentalists are especially concerned about weakening technology-based requirements in Eavor of waterquality-based standards considering the poor record of implementation of the latter program. Id.
183. INTERSTATE
SANITATION
COMMISSION,
1997 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (1998).
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that discharger and incorporate those limits into its NPDES permit.la4Because water quality standards for dissolved oxygen are not
being met in the Sound, additional controls beyond technologybased must be imposed to attain state water quality standards for
dissolved oxygen.'85

2. Water Quality Standards
Unlike technology based standards which apply numerical limits
to specific categories of dischargers, water quality standards dictate
the quality that the ambient water in the stream, lake or other water body must achieve. Established pursuant to Section 303 of the
Clean Water Act,'% they are designed to ensure that a water body
maintains a level of quality which protects human health and the
environment. States are required to designate water quality uses
such as "fishable" or "recreational contact," and to set standards to
protect those uses employing criteria established by EPA.'"
If water quality standards are being violated in a particular body
of water, the state is required to take certain actions to reverse the
impairment Under section 303(d) (1) (c) of the Act, the state must
determine the maximum amount of each offending pollutant that
may be discharged into the water body without causing the level of
that pollutant in the ambient water to exceed the state water quality standard.'= This is essentially a technical and scientific en184. See Clean Water Act § 301(b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (1(C).
185. Connecticut and New York water quality standards for dissolved oxygen for the
Sound are 5-6mg/liter. &discussion, supra note 21. In addition to the POTWs, there are a
few private industrial plants in Connecticut which have significant discharges of nitrogen to
the Sound, although their combined discharges are only 6717 pounds a day. PHASE111
PROPOSAL,
supra note 21, at 10. None of these plants have total nitrogen limits in their permits, although they are required to monitor for the pollutant. Personal communication with
Kenneth W. Major, Permits, Enforcement & Remediation Division, Water Management Bureau, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (Apr. 23, 1998). Accordingly,
there is no technology-based effluent limitation in effect.
186. &Clean Water Act 303, 33 U.S.C. 1313.
187. Clean Water Act 5 303(a) (3), 33 U.S.C. 5 131(a) (3). If the water quality standard set
by the a state does not meet EPA approval, the EPA must promulgate an appropriate standard in its place. Clean Water Act 303(c)(3), 5 33 U.S.C. 1313(c)(3).
As part of its water quality standards a state must have an antidegradation policy, which is
intended to insure that water quality will not fall below its current level and that existing uses
of a waterbody will be maintained. This applies regardless of whether the uses actually have
been designated. See 40 C.F.R. 131.12(a) (1). If the water is cleaner than necessary to s u p
port fishable/swimmable uses, that water quality must be maintained unless important e c e
nomic and social goals dictate otherwise. See 40 C.F.R. 5 131.12(a) (2); DRAFTFRAMEWORK,
supra note 61, at 2-1
188. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (1) (c). Sac D m FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 2-3. The Clean
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deavor, in which the state .may employ various tools and techniques, including monitoring and modeling.'89 The aggregate
amount of a pollutant which can be discharged and still maintain
water quality standards, including a margin of safety, is the "total
maximum daily load (TMDL)."'~"The calculations to establish
TMDLs must be made available to the public,'g' but there is no explicit mechanism required for public input unless the proposed
TMDLs are disapproved and EPA issues its own.'92
Once a state determines the TMDL for a pollutant, it must allocate the total load among the various point and nonpoint dischargers on the w a t e r b ~ d ~ . The
' ~ ' EPA provides little guidance on
the manner in which the loadings are to be apportioned, and the
decision is essentially a matter of state policy. 194 After an allocation
has been made to a discharger, it is used to calculate an effluent
discharge limit for the pollutant at issue, which will be more strinWater Act envisions a federalstate partnership. Within the federal regulatoly framework
states may choose to administer substantial portions of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 402(b).
Both Connecticut and New York have been delegated such responsibility, and both have
adopted water quality standards for various pollutants, including dissolved oxygen. See supra
note 21.
189. 40 C.F.R § 130.7(a).
190. Clean Water Act Section 303 (d) (1) (C) provides that each state shall establish:
the total maximum daily load, for those pollutants which the Administrator identifies.. . as suitable for such calculation. Such load shall be established at a level neces
sary to implement the applicable water quality standards with seasonal variations and a
margin of safety which takes into account any lack of knowledge concerning
- the relationship between effluent limitations and water quality. .
33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d)(1) (C).
191. 40 C.F.R 5 130.7(c) (1) (ii).
192. 40 C.F.R. 9 130.7(d) (2).
193. The allocations given to point source dischargers for their waste streams are denominated waste load allocations (WLAs); the allocahons for nonpoint sources are called
load alloc&ons (LAs). Identifying nonpoint sources and measuring their contribution to
the pollution problem can pose substantial difficulties, especially when some of the pollutant loading derives from air sources. Controlling nonpoint sources is even more problematic. In practice, the states often calculate as best they can the overall pollutant contribution
from all nonpoint sources, as well as from natural sources, and subtract it from the total pollutant loading that will be allowed. The balance is then allocated among the various point
sources.
194. See Oliver A. Houck, TMDLs,Are We There Yet?: The Long Road Toward Water
Quality-Based Regulation Under the Clean Water Act, 27 E m . L. REP. ( E m . L. INST.)
10391,10398 (1997) [hereinafter Houck, TMDLs].Professor Houck notes that the Act contains no explicit language actually requiring implementation of the TMDLs,and that the
Agency may be left to its authority to review and reject TMDLs, see C.WA § 303(d) (2), 33
U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2), bolstered by its supenision of the permit system. Id at 10399. This
raises a question about the strength of the Agency's ability to force implementation of
TMDLs involving nonpoint sources, since these sources are not regulated under the Act: Id
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gent than the limits dictated by the technology standards.Ig5 The
TMDL process is one which focuses on overall pollutant loadings
and seeks to allocate control responsibility.'" Thus it lends itself
readily to a program in which the responsibility might be shifted
among dischargers through a market me~hanism.'~'
In the case of the Sound, the states have essentially approached
the Sound-wide loading determination on a macrescale, having
calculated the amount of yearly reduction that will be necessary
from the 1990 baseline, and thus the "total maximum yearly loading."lg8The targeted reduction of 58.5 percent has been evenly distributed among the management zones established by the LISS,
and maximum loadings will have to be set for each plant, first on a
yearly basis, and then reduced to monthly and/or daily limits.Ig9To
comply with the Clean Water Act, a formal TMDL process meeting
the requirements of Clean Water Act Section 303(d) must be followed by each state, and the basic calculations for each plant must
be done.''' The loading allocations will be converted into effluent
195. Clean Water Act 5 301(b) (1) (C), 33 U.S.C. 5 1311(b)(1) (C).
196. The TMDL process can be viewed in itself as a type of trading program, in which the
state rather than the market makes the allocations. It is essentially a closed type of system,
since a new source or new discharger will not be allowed to discharge unless "there are suffident remaining pollutant load allocations to allow for the discharge." 40 C.F.R 5
1224(i)(l). Existing dischargers are supposed to be subject to compliance schedules designed to achieve applicable water quality standards. 40 C.F.R 122.4(i)(2). It appears that
this requirement has been honored in the breach.
197. One potential impediment is the poor progress which has actually been made in
TMDL implementation. Few states have actually established adequate TMDLs for their waters, and those which have still failed to carry out meaningful allocations. This failure to
comply with the requirements of the Act has led to a series-of lawsuits brought by environmental organizations around the counuy. See, c.6, Sierra Club v. Hankinson, 939 F. Supp.
865 (N.D. Ga. 1996); Idaho Sportsmen's Coalition v. Browner, 951 F. Supp. 962 (W.D. Wash.
1996); Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly, 762 F. Supp. 1422 (W.D. Wash. 1991);
Alaska Center for the Environment v. Reilly 796 F. Supp. 1374 (W.D. Wash. 1992), a f d sub
nom Alaska Center for the Environment v. Browner, 20 F.3d 981 (9" Cir. 1994); Scott v. City
of Hammond, 530 F. Supp. 288(N.D. Ill. 1981), a f d in part, reu'd in part, 741 F.2d 992,996
(7" Cir. 1984), cerf. h i e d , 469 U.S. 1196 (1985); sec also Houck, TMDLr, supra note 194, at
1039310396. r\s of September 1997, there were nine states with respect to whi;h EPA is under court order to establish TMDLs if the states do not do so; twelve states in which litigation
is pending; and 5 states with respect to which citizens groups have filed notices of intent to
sue. EPA, Office of Water, TMDL Litigation By State, (visited Apr. 15, 1998)

<http://www.epa.gov/OWOW/tdml/lawsuitl.hrml >.
198. The loading must of course accurately represent the reductions necessary to achieve
water quality standards, which is not assumed. Seesupra note 54 and infia note 225.
199. See40 C.F.R. 5 122.45(d)(l).
200. A survey conducted by EPA found TMDL cost estimates as high as $1 million. OFFICE
OFWATER,
EPA, TMDL DEVELOPMENT Cow ESTIMATES:
CASESTUDIES
OF 14 TMDLs, EPA-R96401 13, Fig. 4 (1996). (visited Apr. 15, 1998) <http://www.epa.gov/
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limitations incorporated in the NPDES permits. They thus will
serve as the baseline for a trading program.
The Long Island Sound dissolved oxygen target is based on
achieving and maintaining desired levels in the most stressed parts
of the Sound. The allocation of loadings is designed to distribute
the loadings fairly across all zones and dischargers. However, a discharger which is within its overall limit still may have a substantial
impact upon local water quality. It is possible, therefore, that some
plants may be required to meet even more stringent limits than
dictated by the 58.5 percent reduction goal because their discharges are or would contribute to localized water quality problems, creating "hot spots." Plants in such a situation present problems in any trading program, but are especially troublesome for
water programs, since most discharge to relatively confined bodies
of water. These plants should be required to meet their specified
effluent discharge limitations, and not be permitted to purchase
credits to achieve c ~ m ~ l i a n c e However,
.~'
to the extent a source
controls its discharge to a level lower than required by water quality
considerations, it could be allowed to sell the increment.
The ultimate goal of the Clean Water Act is to eliminate the discharge of pollutants to our Nation's waters,2Mand the entire structure of the Act is designed to require increasingly stringent technology limits, with the safety net of water quality standards. To be
faithful to both the language and the intent of the Act, any trading
program must be constructed in a way which advances towards the
goal. It is critical, therefore, that the trading baselines established,
which are contingent upon water quality standards, areas accurate
as possible, a problem when limitations are based on modeling, an
imprecise science. Moreover, monitoring must be thorough and
extensive to insure that reductions actually occur as claimed and
OWOW/tdml/tmdlcost.html>. These costs are borne by the public, and should be considered in any discussion of uansaction costs of developing a pollution trading program. In
addition, it has been suggested that the analysis costs to the plant or permit writer of reviewing a trade or the effort involved in revising a TMDL or wasteload allocation due to new data
could be an impediment to trading. WEF, Comments on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading. supra note 154. at 67.
201. The situation is similar under the Clean Air Act, since the Act does not relieve a discharger from complying with the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for S02.
In that regard, localized impacts of water discharges, which are usually into relatively confined waters, may be more severe than air emissions which tend to disperse more widely.
Members of the Long Island Sound Ad Hoc Trading Group have generally agreed that trading should not be allowed when it contributes to local water quality impairment.
202. Clean Water Act 5 101(a)(l),33 U.S.C. 5 1251(a)(l).
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that water quality is not endangered. But meeting water quality
standards will only achieve the fishable/swimmable goal of the Act;
therefore, to reach the goal of eliminating discharges, a trading
program should also contain successively more stringent reduction
requirements.

B.

Implementation

1.

Permits

The primary implementing mechanism of the Clean Water Act is
the NPDES permit. Along with a variety of other requirements, it
prescribes the permit holder's effluent discharge limitations based
on both technology and water quality standards.203The permit may
be issued for no more than five years:M and provides that the issuing authority, typically the state? may reopen the permit under
specified ~onditions."~
When issuing a permit, the state must provide for public input, including opportunity to challenge the permit.''
Modifying a permit requires that similar procedures be followed, unless, under the regulations, the modification is deemed
minor.''' Since changes in effluent limitations, in most instances,

203. Conditions applicable to all permits include requirements for proper operation and
maintenance, inspection and entry, monitoring and record keeping and reporting, 40
C.F.R 5 122.41, as well as compliance with both water quality and technology based standards. 40 C.F.R 5 122.44. The regulations make it explicit that a permit may not be issued
"[wlhen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance with the applicable water
quality requirements of all affected States[.]" 40 C.F.R 5 122.4(d).
204. Clean Water Act 5 402(b) (1) (B), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b)(1) (B).
205. Authority to administer the Clean Water Act has been delegated to both Connecticut
and New York pursuant to Clean Water Act 5 402(b), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b). See supra note
164.
206. 40 C.F.R 5 122.41(f); 40 C.F.R 5 122.44(c). The reasons for which a permit may be
modified are spelled out at 40 C.F.R 5 122.62(a). There is not an obvious one within which
a modification-due to a trading program would fit, although this is apparently being done in
at least one trading program. See Teitz, A m ' n g Point Source Dircharge Permit Trading: Case
Study in ControllingSclmiurn Dirchargcs lo the San Rancisco Bay Estuary, supra note 151, at 111 &
n.188.
207. Clean Water Act 5 101(e), 33 U.S.C. 5 1251(e) (public participation in implement
Act encouraged; states must develop regulations); Clean Water Act 5 402(b) (3). 33 U.S.C. 5
1342(b)(3) (state must provide opportunity for public hearing on proposed state permit);
40 C.F.R $5 124.10-12, 124.17 (public notice and comment, hearings, agency duty to respond to comments). See also 40 C.F.R § 123.30 (judicial review must be the same as that
available to obtain judicial review in federal court of a federally-issued NPDES permit; see
Clean Water Act $ 509,33 U.S.C. 5 1369).
208. See 40 C.F.R 5 122.62.
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will always be major,P0g
a draft permit must be issued and the public
participation procedures and other applicable state or federal
regulations must be followed.210 Accordingly, modification of a
permit may take a minimum of several months to complete, which
could pose an impediment to trading effluent rights readily and
with minimal transaction costs.211This issue is discussed in more
detail in the analysis of the anti-backsliding restriction below.
An emissions trading program places substantial reliance on the
discharge permits and inventories, so to the extent those are deficient, water quality may not be p r o t e ~ t e d . ~Facilities
'~
which have
actual levels of discharges substantially below permitted levels
would find themselves with a trading opportunity which, if exploited, could degrade water quality.213
Accordingly, strict attention
must be paid to defining the trading baselines or benchmarks incorporated into the program, and to the corresponding monitoring.'14 Because of the complications introduced by interfacility
trading, it is likely that both effluent and ambient water monitoring
will need to be increased in order to assure that reductions are actually taking place, and that localized impacts are not created.

209. Minor modifications we smctly limited to such matters as correcting typographical
errors, reflecting changed ownership, requiring more frequent monitoring, changing certain schedules and other ministerial type actions, none of which relate to substantive
changes in effluent limitations. Sec40 C.F.R. 5 122.63.
210. 40 C.F.R 5 122.62. The public notice and comment period, and possible public
hearing may take several months. See 40 C.F.R $5 124.10-12. Nevertheless, it is a crucial
element of Clean Water Act implementation.
211. This was apparently a problem in the Fox River trading program discussed in the
following section. Sec inj5a Part V,A. The Water Environment Federation has suggested that
reopener clauses create market uncertainly, since a permittee cannot be sure that its permit
requirements will be unchanged for the duration of the permit. The Federation suggests
that some minimum time period be established during which the discharge limitation s u b
ject to trading will not be changed,'in order to foster market certainty. See WEF, Comments
on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading, supra note 154, at 10.
212. &TIETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL
AND NATURAL
RESOURCE ECONOMICS,
supra note 55,
at411.
213. This situation is not an unusual one, since facilities often discharge below their permitted levels. This may occur because the effluent limitations are categorical ones estab
lished for the industry as a whole, and not for the individual plant, or because the facility is
being operated conservatively in order to assure compliance and avoid penalties. Unlike
effluent discharge limitations for industrial sources, which are calculated based upon a reasonable measur; of actual production, limitations for POTWs are calculated based on design flow, not actual discharge levels. 40 C.F.R. 5 122.45(b) (1991).
214. TIETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL
AND NATURAL
RESOURCE ECONOMICS,
s u p note 55, at
411.
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An ti-backsliding.

In order to achieve the no discharge goal established in the
Clean Water
Congress inserted into the Act an increasingly
stringent set of technology requirements, and prohibited easing of
most effluent discharge limitations once they had been incorporated into a permit.216Thus, Clean Water Act § 402(0) (1) bars the
renewal, reissuance or modification of a permit which contains an
effluent limitation that is less stringent than those contained in the
217
previous permit.
This basic proscription is consonant with both
the scheme of increasingly stringent discharge requirements, and
the overall technology forcing theme of the Act."' Accordingly,
the Act is most strict when the effluent limitation in question is
based on technology, rather than water quality considerations. In
the former situation, the discharge limitations may not be relaxed
in an existing permit, even if new technology based effluent guidelines are issued which would othenvise allow a more generous discharge limit. 219
The requirements of the Act are somewhat less strict when a
permittee's effluent limitations are water quality rather than technology based.=' In that event, backsliding may occur in two situations. First, pursuant to section 402(2), if water quality standards
are not being achieved, but a new TMDL and wasteload allocation
has been accomplished whereby the cumulative effect of the revised loadings will result in lower total pollutant loadings and will
ensure that water quality standards will be attained, then a reissued
permit may contain less stringent limits.=' In essence, the loading
215. Clean Water Act 101(a) (I), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1).
216. Clean Water Act 402(0), 33 U.S.C. 1342(0).
217. 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(0)(1); scc40 C.F.R 122.44(1).
.
218. See, e.g., Clean Water Act 5 301 (b).
219. Clean Water Act 5 402(0)(1), 33 U.S.C.
1342(0)(1); see 40 C.F.R § 122.44(1).
There are certain exceptions, such as for plant alterations or for technical mistakes o r mistakes of law made in issuing the permit. Clean Water Act 35 402(o) (2) (A)-(E), 33 U.S.C.
1342 (0) (2) (A)-(E); 40 C.F.R 122.44(1) (2) (i) (A)-(E). If the permittee has installed and is
properly operating and maintaining the appropriate technology, and is meeting current
effluent guideline requirements but cannot mekt the more suGgent requirements of the
permit, Clean Water Act $402(o)(2) (E) allows the limits to be relaxed to the level which the
plant is actually attaining. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(o)(2) (E); 40 C.F.R 122.44(1) (2) (i) (E).
220. However, technical mistakes or mistaken interpretations of law made when issuing
the permit, which may allow backsliding from a technology based permit, d o not apply to
water quality based permits. See Clean Water Act § 402(0)(2)(B)(ii), 33 U.S.C.
1342(0) (2) (B) (ii).
221. Clean Water Act 402(0)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(0)(2)(B); scc Clean Water Act 5

s§
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has been reallocated during the process and another discharger
will be reducing its loadings to c ~ m ~ e n s a t In
e . the
~ second situation, if a waterbody is attaining water quality standards, the permittee's water quality based effluent limitations may be reduced only
following compliance with the antidegradation policy established
under the A C ~ . ~ ' Overall, the statute makes it explicit that no permit may be renewed, reissued, or modified if the effluent limitations do not meet current technology-based effluent guidelines and
assure that applicable water quality standards are achieved.n4
Similar to the issue of whether a trade would constitute a permit
modification, the applicability of the backsliding prohibition may
present problems for a trading program. Assuming a plant is given
a specific pollutant loading limitation in its permit, but complies
with that limit by purchasing credits, has it, in effect, been allowed
to backslide to a less stringent limitation? This may be especially
problematical if the permit is actually altered to reflect the arguably "less stringent" limit and the credit purchase. However, a close
analysis of the statutory scheme and implementing regulations suggests that this provision could be addressed in a manner that will
keep it from being a major impediment to nitrogen trading on the
Sound.
First, if a changed permit limitation based on a trade is deemed
to fall within the scope of the anti-backsliding prohibition, it may
still be allowed if it comes within one of the narrowly circumscribed exceptions spelled out in the statute. As discussed above,
the technology standard applicable to sewage treatment plants is
secondary treatment, with which all of the relevant plants are in

303(d) (4) (A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313 (d)(4) (A). Section 303 was revised in 1987 to prohibit revision of a TMDL unless all designated uses will be attained. Water Quality Act of 1987, 5
404(b), Pub. L. NO. 100-4,101 Stat.7.68 (1987).
222. One further situation in which water quality based effluent limitations may be reduced when the standards are not being attained arises when a designated use has been
eliminated. Clean Water Act 5 303(d)(4)(A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313 (d)(4)(A). The circumstances under which a state may remove designated use are quite limited. Sex 40 C.F.R 5
131.10(h).
223. Clean Water Act 5 402(0) (I), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(o) (1); sec40 C.F.R 5 122.44(1) (2) (ii).
See alro DRAFTFRAMEWORK, mpTa note 61, at 2-3. Each state is also required to establish an
antidegradation policy to protect water quality. It must comply with minimum requirements
established by EPA. 40 C.F.R 5 131.12; su, ag., New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, Organization and Delegation Memorandum No. 8540, Water Quality
Antidegradation Policy, September 9,1985
224. Clean Water Act 5 402(0) (3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(0) (3).

Heinonline - - 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 180 1998

19981

Reducing Nitrogen Pollution

181

compliance.255Nitrogen limits in the plants' permits will accordingly be based on water quality considerations. It may be argued
that the formal TMDLs to be prepared by Connecticut and New
York for the Sound will allow the states to relax individual permit
limits, since the cumulative effect of all the sewage treatment plant
permit revisions will result "in a decrease in the amount of
[nitrogen] discharged to the [Sound]rr 226 and "will assure the attainment of [the applicable] water quality ~tandard."~'Although
this is appealing on its face, one factual complication does arise.
Based on LISS modeling efforts, it is not at all certain that dissolved
oxygen goals can be achieved even if the full 58.5 percent reduction is achieved sound-wide.=' Moreover, both the interim and
long-term goals established in the Management Plan are not regarded as ~ ~ c i e n tstringent
ly
to meet current state water quality
~ t a n d a r d s . But
~ if that is indeed the situation, then the TMDL
would appear to be insuflicient from the beginning, calling into
question the legality of the entire procedure.
In the final analysis, the antibacksliding issue can be avoided in
large part, since very few dischargers now have actual nitrogen
limitations in their permits, and steps could be taken to assure that
any new or reissued permits are drafted in such a fashion as to specifically avoid the problem. Permit writers have substantial latitude
in defining the terms of a permit, so long as the statute and regulations are observed. For instance, a permit might be written to specify that, provided the requisite technology based limitations and localized water quality limitations were met:90 the effluent limitations
specified in the permit could be achieved either by actual reductions at the plant, or through the purchase of allowances or as an
alternative method of compliance."' By careful attention to the
225. Secsupro Partlv,A, 1.
226. Clean Water Act 5 402(0) (2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1842(0)(2).
227. Clean Water Act 5 303(d) (4) (A), 33 U.S.C. 5 1313(d) (4) (A).
228. PHASE111 PROPOSAL, supra note 21. at 9. The situation is further complicated since
EPA is in the process of developing regional marine oxygen criteria to deal with nutrients.
These may lead to changes in state water quality criteria. -1d at 15; EPA to Deucfop New Water
@lily Crileriajor Nutrimts, INSIDE EPA, Oct. 10,1997, (Weekly Report), at 1-2.
229. Sec supra notes 49.
230. Obviously trading to improve the water quality in the Sound should not be allowed
to cause local water quality impairment.
231. The prohibition on discharges found in Section 301 (b)(l)(C) of the Clean Water
Act provides that effluent limitations must be sufficiently stringent to "meet water quality
standards.. . established pursuant to any State law or regulations." Arguably a trading p r e
gram will only be approved if the states [and EPA] determine that the total impact of all in-

-
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language of the permits, the potential impediments inherent in the
anti-backsliding provisions of the Act might be avoided. Questions
of enforceability may nevertheless be raised, to which we turn next.

3.

Enforcement.

From the inception of the Clean Water Act, enforcement has
played a key role in assuring that statutory and regulatory requirements were met and water quality protected. Section 309 of the
~ c e ~ ~ c o n t aboth
i n s civil and criminal sanctions and provides a
p o w e h l tool to force compliance by dischargers. Similar provisions are found at the state
Congress empowered citizens
to bring enforcement actions to both stimulate and supplement
the efforts of the government:94 and it has been citizens who have
been responsible for many compliance suits.435The cornerstone of
Clean Water Act enforcement, both for the government and for
citizens, is the system of self-monitoring and reporting established
by statute and by regulation.296Section 308 of the Act requires the
permit holder to install and maintain appropriate equipment to
sample and monitor its effluent, establish and maintain records of
the results, and report them to the permitting agency.237Discharge
monitoring reports (DMRs), required to be filed at prescribed intervals which detail the level of compliance achieved for the specified effluent limitations,238 are key to facility of oversight and enlimitations will be to maintain or improve water quality, thus meeting the
dividual
letter and the intent of the lay.
232. 33 U.S.C. 5 1319.
233. For an examination of the tensions inherent in the federaistate'partnership see
David R Hodas, Enfmcement Of Enuironmtal Law In A Triangular Federal System: Can Three
. Not Be A C m d When Enfmcement Authority Is Shared By The United States, The States And Their
Citirenr? 54 MD.L. REV. 1552 (1995).
234. Clean Water Act 5 505,33 U.S.C. 5 1365. For background on federal citizen suit proENFORCEMENT
OF
visions see JEFFREY G. MILLER , ENVTL.L. INST., CITIZENSUITS: PRIVATE
FEDERAL
POLLUTION
CONTROL
LAWS (1987); see also MICHAEL D. AXLINE,ENVIRONMENTAL
CITIZENSUITS(1991).
235. See Adam Babich, Citixen Suits: The Teeth in Public Participation, 25 ENVTL.L. REP.
( E m . L. INST.) 10,141 (1995); see also DANIELRIESEL,ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT,
CMLANLICRIMINAL
5 15.03[1] (1996).
236. &Clean Water Act 5 308,33 U.S.C. 5 1318; 40 C.F.R 55 122.41(j), 122.44(i), 122.48.
237. Clean Water Act 5 308(a), 33 U.S.C. 5 1318(a).
238. &40 C.F.R 5 122.41(1) (4). The reporting frequency may be determined on a casebycase basis, as appropriate for the nature and effect of the discharge, but in no case may it
be less than once a year. 40 C.F.R 5 122.44(i)(3). In practice, reporting is much more frequent. Permit holders must also report within 24 hours any discharge which may endanger
health or the environment. 40 C.F.R 5 122.41(1) (6).
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for~ement.'~~
If the actual discharge exceeds that specified in the
permit, then the DMR provides prima facie evidence of a violation
of the statute, and strict liability will be imposed on the permittee.'" Enforcement then becomes a relatively straightfonvard matter, based on the permit holder's own data.'" To the extent that
permit limitations are unclear, enforcement will be impeded.'"'
A transaction between point sources can be reasonably accommodated within the current permit process. The same technology
and water quality based effluent limitations which would be imposed in the absence of a trading program should be included,
with the permit written to specify the level of discharge limitation
necessary to meet technology based standards, and any additional
increment required by water quality. The need to prevent localized water quality impacts would be taken into account at this point
in setting effluent limits. The permit would then explicitly recognize that the permit holder might achieve the requisite water quality based effluent limitations either by actually reducing its loadings, or by the purchase of credits.
When a permit with such a condition is issued, citizens will have
the opportunity to comment and to present any arguments they
might have against allowing compliance by trading.'" If there is
239. SuU.S. v. CPS Chemical Co., 779 F. Supp. 437, 442 (E.D. Ark. 1991). Congress intended enforcement under the Act to be streamlined and straightforward, stating explicitly
that the purpose of the enforcement provisions "'is to avoid the necessity of lengthy fact
finding, investigations, and negotiations at the time of enforcement. Enforcement of violations of requirements under this Act should be based on relatively narrow fact situations requiring a minimum of discretionary decision making or delay.'" (quoting S.Rep. No. 414,
92"6 Cong., 1" Sess. 64, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668, 3730). Sec
U.S. v. Gulf Park Water Company, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 1056,1060 (S.D. Miss. 1997).
240. SuU.S. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 824 F. Supp. 640,649, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,558
(E.D. Tex. 1993); Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 608 F. Supp.
440,451-52,15 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,785 (D. Md. 1985).
241. SuU.S. v. Aluminum Co. ofAmerica, 824 F. Supp. 640,648.23 Envtl. L. Rep. 21,558
(E.D. Tex. 1993).
242. Permit limitations which include a trading provision may also provide difficulties for
the discharger in instances in which it wishes to avail itself of the bypass and upset provisions
of the regulations. Su 40 C.F.R 55 122.41(m), (n). Under these provisions a permit holder
may be excused for bypassing treatment works or exceeding discharge limitations in narrowly circumscribed conditions, but must make prompt notification to the permitting
authority. 40 C.F.R $5 122.41(m) (3) (ii), (n) (3) (iii). Unless the permit has been amended
to show the actual effluent limitations resulting after a trade, it may be difficult for the o p
erator to ascertain when the defense might appropriately be raised.
243. Clean Water Act 5 402(b) (3), 33 U.S.C. 5 1342(b)(3) (state must provide opportunity
for public hearing on proposed state permit); 40 C.F.R $5 124.10-12. 124.17 (public notice
and comment, hearings, agency duty to respond to comments).
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the potential for local water quality impairment, then a challenge
could be raised at that time and trading would be limited or refused altogether. The exact scope of the allowable trading should
be explicitly spelled out so that once the permit is approved no further agency action is necessary for a trade to occur. Thus issuance
of the permit should constitute final agency action as to allowable
trading, and a court should find review appropriate.444
Once trading commences, citizens should have prompt access to
information regarding purchase and salks, as well as compliance by
While monitoring is important in any enforcement
program, it is even more crucial in incentive based programs since
both discharges and trades must be tracked and correlated. 246
Unless a permit holder can demonstrate to state authorities a
completed transaction to purchase pollution credits, it must comply with the effluent limitations spelled out in its permit. Any exceedances must be reported as such in the plant's DMRs. If a permit holder engages in a trading transaction, proof should be
provided to the state, and the effluent discharge limitations recalculated and either raised (buyer) or lowered (seller) in both permits to reflect that trade. A seller who fails to meet its reduction
obligations would therefore violate its permit and be subject to
sanctions. Its adjusted discharge limitations then become the baseline against which compliance with the permit and the Clean Water
Act is measured, and enforcement undertaken.
It is evident that such a trading scheme would require additional
administrative work to recalculate limits based on trades and to
make data readily available? but the process is critical to maintain244. It is important to avoid situations in which a court would find that a challenge to a
trading scheme could not be brought until an actual trade had taken place. There might be
no mechanism for such a challenge under either federal or state law. The judicial review
provision of the Clean Water Act, section 509, which would apply to the issuance or denial
of a permit by EPA, does not seem to be sufficiently broad to encompass a later trade under
the permit. Clean Water Act 5 509(b)(l) (F), 33 U.S.C. 5 1369(b)(1) (F). Nor would the citizen suit provision of the Act, which allows suits against the Administrator for failure to carry
out a nondiscretionary duty, be applicable, even if the permit was one issued by EPA Sa
Clean Water Act 5 505(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. 5 1365(a)(2). The issue becomes even more problematic under state law, since state judicial review formulations vary. Even if review was
available, it would place an unreasonable burden on a trading program if each individual
trade could be subjected to judicial review.
245. A publicly available on-line data base could provide both a mechanism to facilitate
trading &d a means for the government and citizens to monitor trading.
246. Sa Bartfeld, Point-Nonpoint Sourcc Trading,supra note 62, at 65,8041.
247. For the acid rain program, EPA maintains an on-line Allowance Tracking System
which contains information on allowance accounts and activities. It may be found at
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ing enforceability of the permits and the integrity of the system,
not only for government but also for citizen enforcer^.'^'
Although the Clean Water Act may present some legal hurdles
for a market based trading program, those hurdles represent important environmental protections crafted by Congress which cannot be ignored. Indeed, the Act provides an essential structure for
trading. A carefully crafted nitrogen trading program for Long Island Sound could meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act,
and be consistent with the principles spelled out in the Draft
Frameuork. The question then remains whether it is economically
and politically feasible. We approach these questions by first exarnining current water trading programs.

<http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/atsdata2.html (visited Apr. 15,1998).
248. There is srrong concern on the part of environmentalists about the degree to which
governmental enforcement is sufficiently vigorous. Both federal and state enforcement efforts have been criticized over the years, and citizens have brought litigation when the government failed to do so. See CLEAN WATERNETWORK,
A PRESCRIPTION FOR CLEAN WATER:
HOW TO MEET THE GOALS OF THE CLEANWATERA m 1420, Appendix (Oct. 1997) (as of
1996, 14.5 percent of New York's and 19.5 percent of Connecticut's major indusuial and
municipal facilities were listed by EPA as being in significant noncompliance with their
permits); Todd Robins, Public Interest Research Group, Testimony On Environmental Enforcement Issues, Connecticut General Assembly, Environmental Committee, (Mar. 31,
1997) (PIRG review found that the number of major indusuial facilities in Connecticut in
significant noncompliance was three times the number listed by EPA). For this reason, environmentalists are firm that any water pollution trading programs established under the
Clean Water Act must be structured to facilitate enforcement efforts. Sec Sierra Club, Comments on Draft Framework for Watershed-Based Trading supra note 156; Comments by the
National Wildlife Federation on the U.S.E.PA.'s Draft Framework for Watershed-Based
Trading, supra note 156.
When discussing citizen participation in the Draft Framework, EPA focuses primarily on the
benefits to be achieved from engaging stakeholders in trading processes. DRAFT
FRAMEWORK,
supra note 61, at 2-11. However, of critical concern to environmental public
interest groups are the mechanisms by which citizens may participate in the formulation and
enforcement of wastewater discharge permits. The Clean Water Act, fortified by agency
regulations, specifically provides the right for public,comment in the issuance of a permit,
and a right to challenge the permit once it has bee;l\issued. See 33 U.S.C. 5 1342 (b)(3)
(comment on state permit); 5 509(b) (challenge federal permit); 5 505 (enforcement state
and federal permits). Section 505 of the Act further provides citizens the opportunity to
enforce the terms and conditions of the permit 33 U.S.C. 5 1365. This provision has been
used extensively by citizens, and has sewed to both supplement government enforcement
efforts and to goad officials into action. Indeed, it is especially important to maintain citizens' ability to enforce compliance by public entities such as POTWs, since that has been
unfortunately an area in which the government has often been reluctant to take action. Accordingly, under any trading program, citizens ability to obtain information and to seek
compliance with the law must be maintained.
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Water pollutant trading programs in various forms have been
undertaken in a number of geographic locations.249Although they
differ considerably in structure, scope, specific pollutants, trading
partners and levels of participation, they all generally meet the requirements that EPA has specified in its DraftFramework. A review
of several of these programs provides insight into how they fit into
the legal framework and how they have functioned in practice, with
some explanations. Four of the programs, all of which have received considerable attention, are discussed below.
A.

Fox River, Wisconsin

The Fox River trading program, the first of its kind, was initiated
by Wisconsin in 1981 in response to the failure of technology-based
categorical effluent limitations to control biological oxygen demand (BOD) at two critical sites on the Fox ~iver.'~'The program
was established as a closed point source capand-trade program, to
include fifteen industrial facilities, mostly paper mills, and six municipal facilities (a balance significantly different from Long Island
Sound). Preliminary analysis suggested that trading would allow
point sources to realize an annual control cost savings of as much
as $6.8 million dollars over the traditional regulatory program.s'
Although no provision of the Clean Water Act explicitly authorized trading, Wisconsin appears to have attempted to operate
within the framework of the ~ct."' It calculated an overall BOD
loading for the river and assigned wasteload allocations to 'the relevant point source dischargers, reflected in five-year discharge permit~.~
Dischargers
'
may obtain BOD credits by reducing their pol249. See DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, Appendix C. See also Surface Water Quality
Division, Michigan ~ e ~ a r t m eof
n tEnvironmental Quality, Summaly o/ Other State Programs
(visited Dec. 20, 1997).< http://~.deq.state.mi.us/swq/uading/hrml/mtesum.htm >.
250. For more detailed discussions of the program see DRAFTFRAMEWORK, supra note 61,
at 513; Hahn, Doctor's O r b , supra note 13, at 97-98.
supra note 61, at 513.
251. &DRAFTFRAMEWORK,
252. It has been pointed out that the manner in which the prois structured may not
conform to the strictures of federal law, and the program may be vulnerable to challenge.
See Tripp & Dudek, supra note 13, at 387. The Fox ~ i v uading
e ~ regulations may be found
at Wk. ADMIN.CODE§ 212.115 (1986); xe olro id 3 212.11 (1985) (detailing the process for
modifying or temporarily reallocating point source allocations); 3 212.40 (1996) (detailing
the loweiFox ~ i v &
water quality related effluent limitations).
253. SeeHahn, Doclor's Orders,supra note 13, at 97.
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lutant loads below their respective allocations, or may purchase
them to cover excess discharges. However, point sources may not
trade unless they can demonstrate need, such as increased production or inability to achieve effluent limitations.254
Within the State's water pollutant trading program, trades must
last at least one year, trading transactions must be reflected in dischargers permits and may not last longer than the permit, and all
trades must be formally approved by the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources. Because of the localized effect of BOD, the
trading program is divided into three river segments, each with a p
proximately an equal number of participants, with a prohibition on
trading between the segments.255
Although the program began in 1981, only one trade has occurred to date, and that was not the type anticipated by the proponents of the plan.256While the objective of the program was clear
and the allocation of pollutant credits relatively straight forward,P5?
there were a number of factors which posed constraints on trading.
Since most of the industrial facilities are paper mills, it is generally
believed that competitive pressures within that industry dampened
any willingness to trade. Moreover, given the uncertainty inherent
in pollution control programs, the mills may well have been reluctant to trade away any portion of the BOD allocation that they may
need to accommodate future
The restriction on trading
between stream segments also presented a problem; it meant that
there were few available trading partners, and the overall economics may have made trading unattractive. Additionally, the administrative review process was described as complex and time consuming, with high transaction costs.259
Despite the lack of trading, the various dischargers did manage
to reduce their pollutant discharges, and BOD reductions in the
river were achieved. However, it is plausible that employing tradi254. S u D m FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 513. One author has suggested that the rationale for this' requirement is to assure compliance with Clean Water Act requirements
concerning permit modifications. See Teitz, supra note 151, at 57 & n.188; 40 C.F.R §
122.62(a).
255. Su AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 35; Hahn, DOC~OTS
Orders, supra note 13, at
98.
256. In this "uade," a paper mill dosed its wastewater treatment plant and moved its
wastewater discharge to a municipal trea&ent plant. The mill then asked the state to shift its
BOD allocation to that plant. & D M F~AMEWORK,supra note 61, at 513.
257. SuTripp & Dudek, supra note 13, at 387.
258. &DRAFT FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 513.
259. SuTripp & Dudek, supra note 13, at 387; Hahn, Doctor's Ordm, supra note 13, at 98.
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tional regulatory means, with comparable costs, could have
achieved similar reductions.
B.

Tar-Pamlico River Basin, North Carolina

A second program which is featured prominently in the literature, is a closed, point/nonpoint, nutrient trading program developed in 1991 for the Tar-Pamlico River Basin in North ~ a r o l i n a . ~ ~ '
The watershed for the river is approximately 5,440 square miles,
Although nonpoint
and much of it is used for agricult~re.~~'
sources were found to account for 92% of nitrogen loadings into
the basin,262
the state's initial response focused on further reducing
discharges by requiring additional pollution controls at a dozen
point sources, -mostly publicly owned sewage treatment plantsat an estimated cost of between $50 and $100 million.z63However,
an economic analysis suggested that similar reductions in nutrient
pollution might be achieved through implementing best management practices for nonpoint sources at an approximate cost of only
$10 million.= With such potential economic savings, the point
sources in the basin (twelve POTWs and one industrial discharger)
formed the Tar-Pamlico Association with the intent of avoiding
costly point source reductions by inducing nonpoint sources to
participate in a nutrient reduction plan.265
The program was designed to be implemented in two phases.
260. For more derails on the program see Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Pub. No. EPA841-F-93010, TMDL Case Study: TarPamlico
Basin,
NC
2
(1993)
(also
available
on
internet
at
<http://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/cs1O/cs1O.htm> (visited Apr. 10, 1998)) [hereinafter
Tar-Pamlico TMDL Case Study]; U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING
OmCE, GAO/RCED 95218,
AGRICULTURE
AND THE ENVIRONMENT:
INFORMATION ON AND CHARAC~XRI!XICSOF S E L E ~ D
WATERSHEDPROJECTS 9, 31-37 (1995) [hereinafter GAO WATWHEDREPORT]; Office of
Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, DraJ Trading
Update-December 96: Tar-Pamlico River, North Carolina (visited
Dec. 21, 1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/uading/am.htm> [hereinafter Tar-Pamlico Up
do&].
The Tar-Pamlico River Basin consists of the Tar River in the upper part of the Basin and
the Pamlico River in the lower pan of the Basin. Tar-Pamlico TMDL Case Study, suprq at 2.
The entire river is over 180 miles long and stretches from the Piedmont to Pamlico Sound.
Sa Tar-Pamlico Update, supra, 12.
261. The watershed is home to over 246 swine, daily, and p o u l q operations. Sec
Tar-Pamlico Updateat 12.
262. Sec Tar-Pamlico Update1 2.
263. &AT. KEARNEY,INC.,supra note 33, at 3-5,36.
264. Sec id at 36.
265. SecGAO WATERSHED
REPORT,supra note 260, at 33.
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During the first, from 1991 to 1994, the point sources were to undertake engineering studies and to implement relatively low cost
control measures.266 In the second phase, 19952004, additional
reductions would be required. To commence Phase I the Association, the North Carolina Department of Environmental Management, and two engronniental public interest organizations, the
Pamlico-Tar River Association, and the Environmental Defense
Fund, entered into a poirit/nonpoint trading agreement. Under
the agreement, a nutrient "bubble" was established with a declining
cap on the total amount of nutrients that the thirteen Association
members as a whole might discharge.267 Credits for trading are
earned by the Association when it is able to reduce its nitrogen or
phosphorus loads below the cap.268Transactions may occur in two
different ways. First, the members of the Association may trade
among themselves to ensure that the Association meets its cap.269
Second, if the Association cannot meet the overall cap, it may pay a
fee to the North Carolina Division of Soil and Water Conservation's Agricultural Cost-Share 'program, which uses the money to
implement BMPs designed to reduce agricultural runoff.
When the second phase was to be implemented there was serious
disagreement over the goals and the allocation of the reductions,
most of which were to be taken from nonpoint sources, sparing
266. Tar-PamlicoTMDL Case Study, supra note 260,at 5.
267.The first phase of the trading program set an initial nutrient cap for the Association
in 1991 at 625,000kg@, which was reduced to 425,000kg/yr in 1994.This cap reflected the
goal of reducing the projected nutrient loads for 1994 by 200,000 kg/yr. This translated
into a 180,000 kg/yr reduction for nitrogen and a 20,000 kg/yr reduction in phosphorus.
Scc Tar-Pamlico TMDL Case Study, supra note 260,at 5.A new cap was set in 1994 for the
second phase of the trading program in 1994. Scc Tar-Pamluo Update, supra note 260 at 1 3.
This cap consists of an overall nutrient cap of 475,000kg/yr, with limits of 405,256 kg/yr for
nitrogen and 69,744kg/yr for phosphorus. Scc id As is obvious from the numbers, the nutrient cap for Phase I1 is less stringent than that set for Phase I.
268. Src Kurt Stephenson, Waldon Kerns, and Len Shabman, Mrginia Tech, Market-Based
Straugiafor Chcsapde Bay P o 4 and Managnncnt: A Literature Synthesis 1 78 (visited March 5,
1997)<http://199.75.0.27/stac/pubs/litsyn96/steph.htmb [hereinafter Literature Synthesis].
One credit allows the ~ssociationto emit one kilogram of nitrogen or phosphorus. Scc
WATER
SCIENCE
REPORTER,supra note 57,at 4. The trading ratio between the two pollutants
is thus 1:l. This is acceptable under EPA's Draft Framework since the impact on the water
body of the two pollutants is similar. &DRAFTWEWORK,supra note 61,at 2-9--2-10.
269. &AT. KEARNEY, INC.,supra note 33, at 3-6. Members may also bank these credits
for future use. Scc ~~OWATERSC~ENCE
REPORTER,
supra note 57,at 4.
270. The Association does not fund programs directly, but purchases credits for $29 for
every kilogram of discharge that is above the .cap. Scc WATERSCIENCEREPORTER, supra note
57, at 4. Credits are good for ten years for structural best management practices, and three
years for non-suuctural BMPs. Scc d o Tar-Pamlico Update, supra note 260 at 14.
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point sources further control requirements. The dispute over the
goals is especially troubling, since modeling indicated that a 45
percent reduction was called for. Claiming no confidence in the
model, the state instead set a goal of 30 percent. As a consequence, the environmental groups refused to participate in the
program and withdrew their support. Nevertheless, the state implemented its plan, with environmentalists threatening litigation
proceedings.271
Obviously there is some question as to how this program fits
within the structure of the Clean Water Act, since it appears to contemplate that violations of the permitted bubble will be addressed
by payments to the cost-share program. The state has, however,
indicated that it reserved the right to impose traditional effluent
limitations and controls if the cap is not maintained, but this seems
contrary to the trading agreement itself. 2n Most disturbing is the
fact that point source members of the Association are not held accountable for the success of BMPs in reducing nutrient loadings.2"
This raises the possibility that the Association may discharge in excess of otherwise permitted point source levels and purchase credits by making payments to the state, without a matching nonpoint
reduction. This concern exists because the state did not spend a
substantial amount of the money which had been contributed to
the fund by the Association. Of the monies it did spend, some
were used for projects far up the watershed with no demonstration
of impact on the area of concern. The Association was also given
nitrogen reduction credits for the installation of monitoring
equipment and for operational costs, which of course did not reflect any actual reductions.274In addition, it lowered the price of
credits for Phase 11, and subsequently recomputed the number of
credits which the fund represented based on this lower price, swelling their number. As a result of this manipulation, the Association
had a credit of over 22,000 kilograms at the commencement of
Phase 1 1 . ~The
~ ~ avenues available through which citizens are permitted to raise challenges to such state actions is not clear.
271. Scc GAO WATEWHEDREPORT, supra note 260, at 9,35.
272. See AT. KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 36.Individual nitrogen permits are not i s
sued for the members of the Association. Id
273. &AT. KEARNN,INC., supra note 33, at 36.
274. Personal communication with Douglas N. Rader, Ph.D., Senior Scientist, Environmental Defense Fund (Apr. 17,1998).
275. Scc GAO WATERSHEDREPORT, supra note 260, at 34.
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Only two point/nonpoint trades have occurred, and were carried
out at the beginning of the program as a test.476More commonly,
point/point trades have occurred among Association members.277
Even without nonpoint trades the Association did reduce its nutrient discharges 28% by the end of the initial phase, in spite of an
18% increase in its effluent
These reductions were achieved
at modest costs through relatively inexpensive equipment upgrades
and operational plant improvements,279which suggests that the
original cost estimates were seriously inflated and/or that the point
sources had not made serious attempts to find low cost ways to reduce discharges. Therefore, the Association's protestations that it
will need to purchase credits to meet its cap when, in the future,
further reductions are required should be greeted with some skep
ticism. It should also be noted that in spite of the reductions, water
quality does not appear to have improved.280
C.

Lake Dillon, Colorado

A closed, point/nonpoint trading program for phosphorus has
been in existence since 1984 for Lake u ill on,^' a popular recreational area and a reservoir for Denver's drinking water.%' several
substantial skiing resort communities surround the ~ a k e ; 'their
~~
continuing expansion fueled concerns that increased nutrient
loadings of phosphorus from rapid population growth in the area
would cause eutrophication of the ~ a k e . ~ Point
'~
sources were
found to account for only 2% of the phosphorus load into the
~ a k e , ~primarily
'~
from local municipal sewage treatment plants;
the main source of nonpoint source pollution was runoff from
276. SeckT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 3-6.
277. Sa Tar-Pamlico Updak,supra note 260 at 1 1.
278. Sec id 15.
279. SecGAO WATERSHED
REPORT, supra note 260, at 37.
280. Sec id. at 36.
281. Sec EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Drafl Trading UpdateDecember
96: Lake
Dillon,
Cohaab,
1 1 ((visited March 4, 1997)
<http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/~ding/ledi.htm> [hereinafter Lnkc Dillon Up
date]. The Colorado State Water Quality Control Commission codified the trading program
as the Dillon Control Regulation in 1984. Sa LaRcDillon Updote, supra note 281, I3; 5 Colo.
Code Regs. § 1002.71 (1997).
282. SaLakeDillon Updale,supra note 280 12.
283. They include Breckenridge, Keystone, Dillon, Frisco, and Copper Mountain. Sec id
12.
284. &AT. KEARNN,
INC., supra note 33, at 57.
285. Id.
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towns and ski areas, along with seepage from failing septic system~."~
Initially, the State established a TMDL for the Lake for phosphorus and assigned waste load allocations to four POTWS.~'' The trading regulation allows the plants to meet their caps by purchasing
phosphorus reduction credits from the program administrator, the
Summit County Water Quality Committee. The credits are created
by nonpoint source reductions achieved from implementing
BMPS."~
To date, only one point /nonpoint trade has occurred, and that
was executed in an effort to test the program.289Point sources have
not been obligated to trade in order to meet their phosphorous
limits as a result of increased plant eficiencies and slower than expected population
Indeed, the Lake Dillon point
sources were able to attain some of the highest phosphorus reduction capabilities in the country.291It appears, therefore, that anticipated point/nonpoint trades are unlikely to occur unless renewed
population growth puts a strain on present capabilities.292
As a consequence, the trading program has refocused on nonpoint/nonpoint trading.293 The 1984 trading program and local
policies now essentially require a "no net increase" for phosphorus
loads into the lake from nonpoint sources.294The trading program
currently allows new nonpoint sources to offset their phosphorus
286. See Lake Dillon Update, supra note 281, I2.
287. It set a total loading of 4610 kg/yr. See id ll 3 See ako WATERSCIENCE
REPORTER,
supra note 57, at 4.
288. See Luke Dillon Update, supra note 281,l 3. The Summit County Water Quality Committee coordinates the trading program. The Committee identifies potential BMP projects,
distributes phosphorus credits, oversees monitoring, and ensures that nonpoint source pollution reduction ordinances are adopted and implemented. See ako WATER SCIENCE-RE
PORTER,supra note 57, at 4. The regulation calls for a 2:l trading ratio, whereby a point
source may receive a credit equal to one kilogram for every two kilograms of nonpoint
phosphorus removed See Lake Dillun Update, supra note 281,l 3. Additionally, point source
permits must be modified when point/nonpoint trades occur to include a record of the
credit amount, specified construction requirements for nonpoint source controls, monitoring and reporring requirements for nonpoint source BMPs, A d operation and maintenance
requirements for BMPs. See id
289. &AT. KEARNEY, INC.,supra note 33, at 37.
290. &DRAFTFRAMEWORK,
supra note 61, at 8-1.
291. Phosphorus loadings were reduced from 3.748 kg/yr in 1981 to 529 kg/yr in 1991.
See Luke Dillon Updutc, supra note 281, f 5.
292. .%AT. KEARNEY, INC.,supra note 33, at 3-7.
293. See LukeDillon Ll@!.uk,supra note 281,l 1.
294. See Literature Synthesis, supra note 268, f 74.

Heinonline - - 2 3 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 1 9 2 1 9 9 8

19981

Reducing Nitrogen Pollution

193

loads by implementing BMPs at existing nonpoint sources.295
There have been three nonpoint/nonpoint "trades" to date.296
D. Cherry Creek Basin, Colorado
Cherry Creek Reservoir is a major recreational spot southeast of
~ e n v e r . ~In' 1984, the Cherry Creek Basin Authority, 298 in an effort to protect the water quality in the reservoir, calculated a
TMDL for phosphorus and allocated the loadings to twelve sewage
treatment plants. In 1985, the Cherry Creek Control Regulation
was established which allowed point sources to receive credits for
the reduction of nonpoint source loadings of phosphorus achieved
by implementing BMPs. First, however, urban nonpoint sources
had to make a 50 percent reduction from 1990 base year before
trades could take place. However, no guidelines for trading were
developed, and no trades occurred, most likely because the population did not increase as anticipated.299
In an effort to revitalize the program, the Authority drafted
guidelines for a point/nonpoint trading program for phosphorus,
and submitted a copy to the Colorado State Water Quality Control
Commission in April, 1997, for
The Authority gener295. Set Lake D i h Update, supra note 281,15.
296. First, the Frisco Sanitation Disuict used storm water controls to achieve additional

phosphorus load reductions. The Town of Frisco plans to bank those 'credits" to use for
loads that a new golf course is expected to generate. Second, Keystone ski resort paid to
connect individual septic systems to sewer lines to reduce phosphorus loads, essentially
banking credits to apply to projected nonpoint source loading from future resort develop
ment. S w D m FRAMEWORK, supra note 61, at 81. Third, the Town of Breckenridge banked
a 25 kg/yr credit when it sewered one subdivision that had a 50 kg/yr load. Scc Lake D i h
Update, supra note 281,15.
297. Scc EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Draft Trading Update: December
96: Chmy Cseek Basin, Colorado, 1 2 (visited March 4, 1997) <http://ww.epa.gov/
owow/watershed/trading/cheny.htm> [hereinafter Chmy Cruk Update].
298. Scc id 1 2. The Cherry Creek Basin Authority is in charge of water quality management in the Basin, and is comprised of representatives from counties, cities,-towns waste;ter districts and ex-officio members that ripresent State, Federal and regional organizations
who have a hand in protecting the Basin's watershed. Id 13.
299. See Chmy Crcck Update, supra note 297, q 1; Summoq of Other State Programs, supra note
249,15.
300. Personal communication with Ronda L. Sandquist (March 24, 1997). Scc generally

CHERRY
CREEK
BASINAUTHORITY,
DRUT OF CHERRY
CREEK
BASINWATER
QUAL~NAUTHOIUIY
EFFLUENT
TRADING GUIDELINES
(1997) [hereinafter CHERRY
CREEKGUIDELINES].The purpose of the program is described as follows: T h e Trading Program allows point source dischargers to receive phosphorus pounds for new or increased phosphorus wasteload allocations in exchange for reductions of phosphorus loading from nonpoint sources." Id at 1
Under the new uading guidelines, &o types of trades-are allowed: (1) Authority project
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ates credits by implementing BMPs and placing those credits in a
"trading pool."g0' These trading pool credits may then be purchased by individual dischargers.302To date, the Cherry Creek Basin Authority has generated credits for the trading pool by implementing four nonpoint source control projects, with plans to
initiate others.90s

E.

Analysis

Two dominant themes appear when analyzing the above examples. First, few real trades occurred in any of the programs. In all
of them trading was rendered unnecessary, at least for the time being, because facilities reduced discharges to or below required levels through facility changes or improved operation and maintenance. Trading may have provided an incentive for dischargers to
improve their pollution reduction controls and reduce their discharges below their cap, either to avoid purchasing credits, or with
an expectation of selling them.%' On the other hand, the existence
trades, and (2) private project trades (In-Kind Trades). See id, at 1.
301. See Chmy Creek Up&&, supra note 297,14.
302. See id If there are credits in the Trade Pool, a point source may purchase phosphorus credits only if: (1) there is a need for credits, (2) the treatment facility operates as efficiently as possible now and in the future with current technology to achieve expected phoc
phorus reductions, (3) present and future compliance with all existing effluent limitations
will be met, and (4) that the treatment facility and trade is consistent with the CCB Water
Quality Management Master Plan and the Cherry Creek Control Reservoir Regulation. Sec
CHERRY
CREEKGUIDELINES,
supra note 300, at 67. Under the second category, privately constructed BMPs to control nonpoint source pollution will be reviewed by the Authority to determine how many 'in-kind" credits such projects are worth. The Authority will then assign
those credits to the private party. A private party may apply its credits to its own point source
discharges, or trade-them with other point sources up&the Authority's approval. Sec id
303. See Chmy Creek Update, supra note 297,1 4. The EPA has also cited Boulder Creek,
CO, where the City made ecological modifications to Boulder Creek which improved water
quality, in lieu of requiring pollutant load reductions, as an example of a point/nonpoint
trading program, with a twist. See EPA, Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds, Drafl
Tradin~ Update-LIecmnber 96: B a r b CT&
Coluradn (visited Mar. 4, 1997)
<http://w&v.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/bould.h [hereinafter Boulder Creek U p
supra note 61, at Appendix C. However, this program
&I&]. Sec also DRAFTFRAMEWORK,
does not fit the basic criteria of a trading program: there are no established trading guidelines, there are no credits to be purchased or sold, and there are no real trading partners.
Boulder Creek can really be viewed as a common sense approach alternative to trading. The
City voluntarily used money to control nonpoint source pollution instead of implementing
expensive plant upgrades. Obviously such an approach should be considered before a trading program is developed. Although the program is not a trading program, but simply a
habitat restoration effort, it suggests other options which might be of some value on Long
Island Sound.
REPORTER,
supra note 57, at 5.
304. &WATERSCIENCE
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of the cap itself may be the real market driver.
Second, despite the lack of trading, pollution reduction goals, if
not water quality goals, were attained.g05 Fox River achieved desired BOD levels; Tar-Pamlico achieved desired nutrient load reductions; and Lake Dillon achieved desired phosphorus load red u c t i o n ~ . ~Although proponents of trading argue that the
programs were successful examples of trading programs, we must
ask whether a major factor was the existence of caps on pollution
discharges, and not necessarily the availability of trading. In fact it
appears in the Tarr-Pamlico case that the less stringent requirements in the second phase of the program effectively reduced any
incentive to trade. Additionally, critics might suggest that the same
reductions could likely have been achieved through more traditional regulatory means.
In the final analysis, when these programs are evaluated strictly
in terms of progress toward achieving pollution reduction andwater quality goals, they can arguably be considered successful. However, in the programs, trading did not produce the desired load
reductions. Instead, the reductions were accomplished by increases in plant operating efficiencies without regard to trades. It
has been asserted that these programs are simply not ripe, and that
trading will occur once low-cost options are unable to keep pace
with rising pollutant 10ads.~' Nevertheless, without a sufficient
market driver, such as a lower cap, trading is not likely to occur
within these programs in the near future. This is an important
point to keep in mind when examining the Long Island Sound
305. For example, Fox River, Tar-Pamlico, and Lake Dillon have all had few trades that
were actually contemplated by their respective programs. Fox River has had two reallocations of BOD and no actual point/point trades; Tar-Pamlico has had only two
point/nonpoint trades to test the system and a few point/point trades among members of
the Association; and Lake Dillon has had only one point/nonpoint trade to test the system
and three nonpoint/nonpoint trades not initially contemplated by the program.
306. Cherry Creek is not included in the above analysis because it has only recently been
developed. However, Cherry Creek does offer the opportunity to predict how a new program will progress. The Cherry Creek program is similar to the point/nonpoint trading
program at Lake Dillon and at Tar-Pamlico. It is likely that the same fate will befall Cherry
Creek as the other programs. Trading will most likely provide incentives to point source
dischargers to become more efficient, thus relieving the need for any trades. If 'no net increase" policies are implemented as with Lake Dillon, the program will likely become a
nonpoint/nonpoint trading program.
307. S~XWATER
SCIENCEREPORTER, supra note 57, at 4. "Rather than an indication of policy failure, the lack of immediate trades demonstrates how a trading system creates pollution
prevention incentives. Once low-cost pollution prevention options are exhausted, trades will
become more frequent." Id.
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proposals.

The Long Island Sound Ad Hoc Nitrogen Trading Discussion
Group has been reviewing the feasibility of developing a nitrogen
trading program to facilitate progress toward the ultimate nitrogen
reduction goal. A "strawman" proposal was prepared which evaluated the various trading possibilities in light of the EPA's DraP
Framacrork for Waterskd-Based ~ r a d i n g . A
~ point-point capandtrade trading program was suggested to include publicly owned
treatment works and the handful of industrial dischargers of high
levels of nitrogen, with an option to integrate a point/nonpoint
program in the f u t ~ r e .The
~ program would cover the entire
Long Island Sound Study area. The Clean Water Act would provide the basis for credit allocations, issued for a specific period of
time, and trades would be reflected in NPDES permits. Under this
original proposal, trades could be made at anytime, with an annual
accounting; dischargers that exceeded their discharge limits for nitrogen would be required to purchase the additional credits necessary for compliance. A credit bank was suggested,.operated by the
states, to supply credits when the market could not meet the demand, and to oversee implementation of the
Utilizing
this proposal as a starting point, various permutations have been
and continue to be examined by the committee in light of the particular geographic, legal, economic and political situation in the
Long Island Sound region. Because of the extent to which these
proposals are in flux, we examine only the major components of
the proposals.
A.

Geographic Considerations

Long Island Sound differs from many other estuaries in that it
has no major source of freshwater at its head, and it is open at both
ends. It receives salt-water flow from the ocean at its eastern end,
and less saline waters from the Upper Bay of New York Harbor
through the East River and Harlem River tidal straits.'" The un308. Sec AT. KEARNEY,INC., supra note 33, at 4 1 9 to 423.
309. If a point source tmding program was established, it might lead to additional attention to the lack of control of nonpoint sources, and perhaps increase pressure for change.
310. Sec AT. KEARNY, INC., supra note 33, at 4-20 to 422.
311. Both of these sources deliver nitrogen to the Sound from outside its geographic
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synchronized tides of the these rivers and the Atlantic, as well as
the differential in spatial openings, contribute to a complex flow
and circulation pattern which varies with the season and meteorological condition^.^'^ During the summer months stratification occurs when warmer fresher water on the surface of the Sound lies on
top of cooler saltier water. The density difference, called a pycnocline, prevents the two layers from mixing which would infuse oxygen into the lower strata. This leads to hypoxic conditions and
their attendant ecological damage.313
As noted earlier, the areas of greatest oxygen deprivation generally occur in the western end of the Sound, near New York City.
Nitrogen from sources in that region therefore has a direct impact
on the area of greatest ecological concern. The impact of nitrogen
from sources farther removed from this area is attenuated. Thus a
given amount of nitrogen discharged in eastern locales contributes
much less to hypoxic conditions levels than does a nitrogen discharge of equal magnitude in western regions.
Nitrogen is a regional pollutant; nitrogen discharged anywhere
in the watershed will have some impact on the western Sound. It
may also have a substantial local impact at the point of discharge. 314
This is an important consideration when designing a pollutant
trading program, since pollutants which have a strong local impact
may not be prime candidates for a large scale trading program.315
Trading functions more effectively when the effects of the pollutants are regional in nature, and the location of the source of the
emissions is not a major factor. A good example of this is the sulfur dioxide trading program under the Clean Air Act, where diverse sources, mostly located in the Midwestern United States, contribute at essentially the same impact level to air quality problems

boundaries. This 'boundw conuibution" is roughly twenty percent of the human-related
nitrogen load. CCMP, supra note 2, at 2&21.
312. CCMP, supra note 2, at 1.
313. SecCCMP SUMMARY,
supra note 27, at 12; supra note 24.
314. TIETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL
AND NATURAL
RESOURCE
ECONOMICS,
supra note 55, at
423.
315. Id at 410.
Emissions trading seems to work especially well for uniformly mixed pollutants [those
for which the location of emission is not an important policy concern]. No diffusion
modeling is necessary to establish effects on ambient concentrations and regulators do
not have to worry about trades creating "hot spots" or localized areas of high pollution
concentration. Trades can be on a one-to- one basis.
Id
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in the ~ a s t . ~The
' ~ Long Island Sound situation differs, however,
from the sulfur dioxide trading program, because although the
pollutant may be regional in nature, source location is nevertheless
an important factor. Due to the varying impacts of the treatment
plants along the Sound, trades cannot readily be made on a one-te
one basis, and the employment of some type of zone system with
trading ratios may be necessary if the trading system is to achieve
317
success.
Accordingly, the original "strawman" proposal recommended that the Sound be segmented into the eleven geographic
management zones which had previously been designated by the
Long Island Sound Study. It was also suggested that @e ratios developed by the Long Island Sound Study reflect the actual impact
of each zone's discharges on critical 'dissolved oxygen levels in the
Sound an be utilized as trading ratios, or "normalized" exchange
rates.318
~urthermore,trading can fit well into the holistic geographic a p
proach called for in a watershed &ategy, since the goal of the
strategy is to improve the overall health of the waterbody.

B.

The Market

In addition to the legal issues that must be addressed when any
trading program is established, the economics of the potential
market must be -examined. Two factors in particular require attention. The first is the pollution control costs of the potential trading
partners. A rational basis for trading exists only if there is a substantial difference among dischargers in the costs of controlling a
given amount ~Fpollution. The second factor is the difference in
environmental impact of equivalent loadings from each source.
The ecological benefit of reducing a single unit of pollution from
one source can be compared to reducing a unit of pollution from a
different source and expressed as a ratio.319Where trading occurs
316. The same conclusion may also apply to nitrogen oxides (in terms of regional haze,
smog and fine particle pollution) and to carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases.
317. TIETENBERG,
ENVIRONMENTAL
ECONOMICS
AND NATURALRESOURCE ECONOMICS,
supm note 55, at 411. Although zoned systems may require additional management and transaction costs, the effort to take location into account may be worth it both in terms of cost
efficiency and environmental response. See id. at 492-94.
318. Local impacts of niuogen discharges would have to be evaluated, and trades which
would impair those waters would be prohibited, even if they were within the overall program
limits for the Sound. Extensive monitoring and analysis would likely be required to ensure
that local waters were protected.
319. Sec DRAFT
FRAMEWORK,
mpa note 61 , at 35.
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between sources in areas with differing influence on the protected
water body, these ratios can compensate for the geographical location of parties.sm Because of the geographic conditions previously
described, for a Long Island trading program to be an environmental success the use of trading ratios would likely be necessary.
1.

Costs of Plant Improvements

Overall costs estimates for upgrading sewage treatment plants
have varied substantially. The Long Island Sound Study originally
estimated costs for nitrogen removal to exceed $8 billion, although a substantially lower figure is likely.3P' More significant
than overall costs are the individual costs to upgrade each plant,
since it is the differential in costs among plants that encourages
trading and leads to market efficiencies. Other factors being equal,
plants having high pollution reduction costs will find it economically advantageous to purchase credits from plants having lower
control costs.
Plant-by-plant estimates of upgrade costs, prepared by Connecticut and New York based on guidance developed by the Long Island
Sound Office, demonstrate the incremental cost effectiveness of
the various upgrades. By comparing the estimated cost of an individual plant upgrade with the incremental reduction in nitrogen
discharge expected from that expenditure, the amount of nitrogen
removed for each million dollars spent can be calculated for each
of the plants. Those figures ranged from 809 lbs/$l million, down
to less than one pound/$l million.325Additional calculations were
carried out combining these costs with the impact ratios described
above. Recognizing the inherent weaknesses in cost estimates, the
resultant figures nonetheless give an approximate idea of the comparative ecological improvement which could be expected in the
most severely stressed portions of the Sound as a result of spending
$1 million in nitrogen reduction at each plant. The impacts
ranged from 1.9 to 0.0008 for each million dollars spent.323This
variation in impact is not surprising, since the areas with the lowest
320. ScckT. KEARNEY, INC.,supra note 33, at 2-17 to 2-18..
321. Sac supra note 33.
322. Scc Memorandum from Mark Tedesco, Technical Director, Long Island Sound Office, to Nitrogen Trading Discussion Group, December 13, 1996, Table 1. The cost data was
provided by the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection and the New York
State Department of Environmental Consenation. Id., Table 2.
323. Id., Table 2.
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dissolved oxygen readings are in the western half of the soundsP4
and, as we have seen, nitrogen loadings in eastern locales contribute much less to hypoxic conditions than do nitrogen loadings of
equal magnitude in western regions.

2.

Trading Ratios

As noted, the Long Island Sound Study has already divided the
watershed into 11 management zones and measured their comparative effects on the
Ratios have been established to
indicate roughly the comparative effect on hypoxia of nitrogen discharge in different areas of the Sound; the zone with the greatest
influence on the areas of lowest dissolved oxygensP6
is given a value,
or normalized exchange rate, of one. Zones with lower impact
have lower values. The following chart shows the zones and the
values. A Long Island Sound trading program could use the values
calculated for the management zone exchange rates as a basis for
the trade ratios in a Sound-wide trading market.
Using these exchange rates, Table 1 was created showing the
relative value of each zone's "credit," or unit of pollution reduction, in each of the other zones. If a credit equals one pound of
nitrogen removed, we see that a single credit from zone 10, which
is located at the western end of the Sound and has the highest impact on the areas of low oxygen, is worth almost six credits from
zone 1, at the eastern end. The table has been provided to demonstrate the relationships among the various source^.^"
Recognizing the theoretical setting in which this exercise is being
carried out, and the limitations of the data, we can nonetheless
usefully engage in an analysis of the potential for trading in a Long
Island Sound market.

324. See CCMP,supra note 2, at 11.
325. Scc AT. KEARNN, INC., supra note 33, at 4-16. The ratios were calculated based on
data produced by the LIS 3.0 model. In addition to the management zones, the Sound itself
was divided into 'response" zones, which correspond to the levels of dissolved oxygen in the
water column.
326. Zone 10.
327. This exchange rate chart was calculated for the author using the normalized exchange rates. For the source of each zone's rates, SWAT.KEARNEY, INC., supra note 33, at 416. By and large areas located closer to the areas of low oxygen will have a greater impact
than those located at a distance. Zones 8 and 9 are somewhat of anomaly, since they lie at
the junction of the Sound and the East River and are affected by circulation patterns there.
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Buyers and Sellers

Management Zone 10, which is located at the environmentally
stressed western end of the Sound, is a logical place to start an examination of interzone trading. It has the most direct impact on
areas of low dissolved oxygen, and its normalized exchange rate is
1.000. Considering only the ecological impact, and assuming similar costs of pollution control among the prospective trading partners, this favorable exchange rate should result in Zone 10 sources
becoming suppliers of credits. A source in Zone 10 would have
high incentive to produce and sell credits, as each credit would be
worth at least 1.068 credits in any other zone. A single Zone 10
credit would be worth as many as 5 credits in Zone 1, located at the
eastern end of the Sound, suggesting that even Zone 10 plants with
high incremental costs could produce credits competitively. If this
is the case, then economic self interest should lead to a reduction
in discharges of nitrogen by Zone 10 sources as they attempt to
produce and export as many credits as economically feasible. A
load reduction in Zone 10 could directly enhance the water quality
of the traditionally oxygen depleted western Sound.
On the flip side, Zone 1 plants could be major credit consumers
because these sources would have much less incentive to make incremental expenditures to produce credits. For instance, a Zone 1
source wishing to produce excess credits to sell in neighboring
Zone 2 would have to produce roughly 1.2 pounds of nitrogen reduction for each pound that Zone 2 needed, because one pound of
pollution in Zone 2 has about 1.2 times the effect on ambient DO
levels than a pound discharged in Zone 1. A price adjustment to
reflect the value of the purchased credit could make it difficult for
the Zone 1 source to recoup its investment or turn a profit.
Nevertheless, an economically efficient source within a zone with
a poor trading ratio might choose to proceed with capital expenditures in the expectation of trading with less efficient sources within
the same zone. Moreover, the weak exchange rate could foster
trading in general by bolstering the demand for credits from other
zones. Zone 1 sources should, prefer to achieve compliance by
purchasing "foreign" credits worth five or six times as much in
terms of pollution reduction as their "domestic credits." This
would effectively foster pollution reduction in the zones with the
highest trading ratios, which are also the zones with the greatest
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ecological impact. This transfer of pollution reduction activities to
the most sensitive areas from less threatened ones should be beneficial to the Sound.
Recognizing that both control costs and trading ratios may have
a substantial impact on the market, we must consider how the two
may affect market decisions in order to determine whether there is
likely to be a sufficient supply of credits for trading to occur.
4.

Forecasting Supply and Demand 328

The probable suppliers and purchasers in a Long Island Sound
trading program can be forecast by examining three factors: the
market size of the zones in question; the number of facilities within
those zones and their incremental cost projections; and the p r e
jected volume of nitrogen removal. An analysis of these factors will
help determine the potential number of credits available. However, the actual geographic extent of the market is somewhat uncertain. There appears to be some skepticism among water pollution officials, especially in New York, regarding the need and the
practicality of a trading program. Some New York officials appear
to believe that the situation confronting major nitrogen dischargers is being sufiiciently addressed through current efforts, and that
a trading program would not enhance reductions.
The major sewage treatment plants which f i e c t the Sound are
located either in New York City, or in Westchester County, New
York, which lies immediately north of the city, or on the western
portion of Long Island. Many of the Manhattan plants are currently slated for upgrades, and the state is providing substantial
funding. A number of these upgrades are required by court order,
and it is unlikely that any of the parties to the litigation would be
interested in attempting to modify the orders so as to.allow a trading program. The four plants in Westchester County already operate under a bubble permit, as do some of the Long Island plants.329
328. The source of all cost and New York volume data is a spreadsheet report entitled
"Point Source Actions," which was distributed to members of the Nitrogen Trading Group.
Connecticut volume data is taken from a spreadsheet dated January 12, 1998, also distrib
uted to members. Both are on file with the author.
329. Sec New York State Department of Environmental Conservation, SPDES Permits Nos.
0026697 (New Rochelle), 0026701 (Mamaronek), 0026786 (Pon Chester), and 0026719
(Blind Brook) all in Westchester County, and Nos. 0026999 (Great Neck), 0022128 (V~llage
o f Great Neck), 0021342 (Huntington), 0026841 (Belgrave), 0026620 (Glen Cove), 0026778
(Port Washington), 0021822 (Oyster Bay), and 0023311 (Kings Park).

Heinonline - - 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 204 1998

19981

Reducing Nitrogen Pollution

205

Consequently, there appears to be little enthusiasm at the present
time on the part of most New York officials for engaging in the
substantial administrative work which a trading program entails,
and which they regard as providing little benefit.s90 This may well
change as the details of the program become more defined, especially if plant operators perceive that potential benefits could be
derived through trading.
It is possible that trading might be initiated in Connecticut instead of New York, as Connecticut officials have voiced more s u p
port for trading. Accordingly, two trading scenarios are provided
below, one reflecting a Sound-wide trading program using the interzone trading ratios, the other a Connecticut only program.
a. Interzone Trading

An interzone trading arrangement would allow trades among facilities in all eleven zones designated by the Long Island Sound
Study, employing the calculated trading ratios. A key factor will be
whether the zones with favorable rates actually produce a substantial number of credits for the market. A review of the data discloses
three zones (Zones 6, 11, and 10) that have very strong exchange
rates with trade ratios of .927or better. This suggests that sources
in these zones would have a strong economic incentive to produce
nitrogen credits, assuming an appropriate demand. Furthermore,
many of the plants can achieve nitrogen removal rates of at least
100 pounds a day for each million dollars expended in capital u p
grades above the 58.5 percent removal goal."' Three of these
POTWs have cost efficiency ratings of over 330 pounds per day per
million dollars spent; Greenwich, located in Zone 6, may be able to
reduce nitrogen more cost effectively than any other plant. That
facility has a cost efficiency rating of over 800 pounds per day per
million dollars spent on capital costs. These levels of cost efficiency
330. Personal communications with Mark Tedesco, Technical Director, Long Island
Sound O&ce (April 22, 1998), and Phillip M. DeGaetano, Director, Bureau of Watershed
Management, ~ h s i o nof Water, New ~ o i k
State Department of Environmental Consetion (April 21,1998). See gmra4, LISS SUMMARY
OF PUBLIC COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSAL
FOR PHASE111 ACTIONS
FOR HWOXIA
MANAGEMENT
(Dec. 1997).
331. The 178 facilities that contribute effluent to the Sound have been ranked in terms of
projected cost efficiency. The agency looked at the incremental amount of nitrogen removal
over the incremental capital c&t of removing nitrogen in excess of 58.5 percent. Sce supra
note 322.

Heinonline - - 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 205 1998

are encouraging because they indicate that these plants should be
able to produce credits at relatively reasonable prices.
A final factor to consider is the projected volume of nitrogen
removal. . Even if a plant is located in a zone with a strong exchange rate and has a high efficiency rating, it may not generite
many credits if it is a small volume facility. Some facilities have projected nitrogen reducdon volumes of 20,000 to 30,000 pounds a
day, which could translate into as' many credits for the market.
Conversely, small POTWs may remove less than 5 pounds a'day.
Capital investment in these facilities might prove to be cost effective, but do little to sustain the supply of credits to the market. In
the three zones with the strongest ratios, only Stamford is projected
to remove in excess of 1000 pounds per day.. Therefore, these .facilities alone may not be able, to supply a substantial number of
credits for the program. However, a sizable number of facilities
could participate in the program; the right combination of supply
and demand need not rest on the production of plants in zones 6,
10 and 11. This is in sharp distinction from some of the trading
programs already considered, which were comprised of a small
number of facilities.332
332. One other potential trading arrangement might be trading only within each zone.
Such intrazone trading between facilities within the same management zone would be done
at a 1:l exchange rate, creating a straightforward market siktion. If supply and demand
are adequate, then uading within the confines of a single zone might take place, whether
interzone trading is successful or even allowed. But as suggested by the Tar-Pamlico experience, the market is not assured. Again we must look at whether each zone has facilities
which can supply credits, and whether there is a sufficient cost differential to create adequate demand for those credits. The answer is not obvious in all the cases.
Zone 1 appears to have the most positive prospects for sustaining intrazone trading. It
contains twenty plants with MIying abilities to implement nitrogen removal technologies in
a cost-effective manner, and sufficientvolume to support trading. While some plants will be
able to cost-effectively implement nitrogen removal (Stonington-Mystic, Groton Town and
Groton Village), others will have substantial difficulty doing so (UCONN, Ledyard, and
Griswold). Each source could remove between 23 and 970 lbs of nitrogen a day, not an excessive spread. This suggests a reasonable likelihood that neither demand nor supply will
outsuip the other. The fact that the most cost-effective suppliers in the zone are also the top
producers is ideal, since they should be capable of creating enough credits to satisfy demand. Yet, these suppliers are not so large that they are likely to flood the credit market
consequently making credit production unprofitable.
By contrast, a viable market within Zone 9 could be problematical. It has only 2 point
sources, but one of its most efficient producers (Newton Creek) is quite large. Its supply of
credits would far exceed the demand of the small intrazone market. Even if interzone trading were available, Zone 9's poor exchange rate (.log) would not make its credits particularly attractive, unless they were priced extremely low.
Zone 10 is unique in that each one of its sources has the potential to be a cost-effective
credit supplier. Without interzone trading, this market could mirror Tar-Pamlico: plenty of
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b. Connecticut-Only Trading

Exchange ratios. Because of a perceived reluctance by New York
officials to participate in a trading program, there has been some
discussion among Long Island Sound officials concerning the possibility of establishing a trading program that would include only
Connecticut sources. To determine whether such a program is viable the exchange ratios must be reset and evaluated, and production and credit demand within the management zones in Connecticut should be examined.
Since the exchange ratios were normalized to Zone 10, a zone
located in New York, they must be recalculated to fit a Connecticutonly arrangement. Due to its influence on the Sound, Zone 6 becomes the marker against which the ratios for the other zones will
be calculated.

TABLE 2
Exchange Rate Charts for CT-Only Pollutant Trading
Seller's Region

1
2
Purchaser's 3
Region
4
5
6

1
2
3
4
5
6
(0.182) (0.218) (0.596) (0.671) (0.854) (1.000)
(0.182) 1.000 0.835 0.305 0.271 0.213 0.182
(0.218) 1.198 1.000 0.366 0.325 0.255 0.218
1.000 0.888 0.698 0.595
(0.596) 3.274 2.733
(0.671) 3.687 3.078 1.126 1.000 0.786 0.671
(0.854) 4.692 3.917 1.433
1.273. 1.000 0.854
1.000
(1.000) 5.494 4.587 1.678 1.490 1.171

Seller's Region: The number at the nexus of Seller's and Purchaser's
zones equals the value of Seller's credit in Purchaser's zone.
Purchaser's Region: The figure indicates how many credits Purchaser
will have to buy from Seller to gain one credit in Purchaser's zone.

suppliers, no buyers. Given the zone's strong exchange rate, the environmental plus that
credit exportation represents here, as well as a poor intrazone demand, interzone trading
scheme is far more appropriate for ZonelO.
The remaining zones have dynamics which appear to suggest that intrazone aading could
be maintained. They are not "top-heavy" like Zone 10, nor as "small" as Zone 9. What
would be lost in an intrazone trading program, however, is the benefit derived from the exportation of credits from zones near "hot spots" to areas with less impaired waters. This consideration militates in favor of interzone trading.

Heinonline - - 23 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 207 1998

Looking only at trading ratios we see that Zones 5 and 6, with ratios of .854 and 1.000 respectively, have the greatest incentive to
produce credits for the market, while Zones 1 and 2, with low trading ratios have the strongest incentive to purchase credits. The
likely market role of Zones 3 and 4 is less clear.
Supply. It should be noted that the daily level of nitrogen removal
is much lower at plants in Connecticut than in New York. Only
eight Connecticut sewage treatment plants could be expected to
remove more than 1000 pounds per day, and none over 5000
333
This indicates that, barring unexpectedly large reducpounds.
tions at other plants, no single sewage treatment plant in Connecticut will dominate the market on either the supply side or the demand side. Zone 6, for example, is benefited by the most favorable
ratio (1.000). It also boasts the most cost effective point source. 334
Yet it does not contain any facilities which remove more than 1400
pounds a day. This means that Zone 6 could not be the sole source
of credits generated for trading, and could not by itself satisfy a
reasonably active market. Similarly, Zone 5 has an exchange ratio
conducive to credit production, but other factors would prevent it
from becoming a dominate market figure. While the zone can potentially supply more credits than Zone 6, it still can only potentially remove 3,500 pounds per day as a zone. Also, none of the facilities in Zone 5 are projected to reduce nitrogen at an
economically efficient level.
Demand. The lack of dominant suppliers could doom a trading
scheme in which demand was high. Plants which were unable to
attain the credits they desired would find it necessary to invest in
capital improvements, even when that investment was not economically efficient. However, in a Connecticut-only trading
scheme, it does not appear that the demand will exceed supply to
any substantial degree. Due to the small size of the facilities, the
potential demand from Zones 1 and 2, where low exchange ratios
exist, will presumably be net purchasers rather than sellers, is not
likely to be substantial.335An exception is Hartford, which is a high
volume facility, but which is projected to be relatively cost efficient,
333. In conuast, the four plants in Zone 8 could each remove more than 5000 pounds of
nitrogen a day.
334. Greenwich.
335. Zone 1 has 20 facilities, none of which is larger than 1000 pounds a day. Its larger
facilities may be able to reduce nitrogen in a cost effective fashion. It does not appear, then,
that Zone 1 will contribute to a demand that exceeds the credit supply.
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increasing the likelihood that they will produce rather than consume
As for Zones 3 and 4, their exchange ratios are not strong
enough to provide incentive to export credits to Zones 5 and 6, but
they do provide incentive to export credits to Zones 1 and 2. Additionally, facilities here may seek to import credits from Zone 5 and
6. The volume and cost effectiveness data supports the prediction
that Zone 3 and 4 will both simultaneously supply and demand
credits.=' The facility in Zone 3 which merits special attention is
the Norwalk plant which removes a state-high 2400 pounds of nitrogen daily. In terms of cost efficiency, this plant ranks in the
middle, thus a decision to undertake substantial capital upgrades
could make it a major producer of removal credits. Overall, the direction in which the Norwalk and Hartford plants choose to proceed could significantly shape a Connecticut trading market.
In spite of the uncertainties, it does appear that a Connecticut
only trading program would operate effectively. The exchange ratios are not substantially different than those which exist in a bistate program, and the variation is sufficient to provide incentives
to export and import throughout the zones. Admittedly, the
amount of nitrogen removed by Connecticut plants, both individually and overall is significantly less than in New York. However, this
should mean that a Connecticut-only program will lack major
power players that dominate either side of the market. This may
result in less trading with regards to the number of credits transferred, but indicates that more facilities would participate in trading. Most importantly, there is no indication that either supply or
demand will exceed the other to a degree which frustrates the
market. The supply and demand seem to be close enough for active trading to take place, and overall the outlook seems positive.338
336. Hartford discharges over 5000 pounds of nitrogen a day, making it the largest facility
in Connecticut. The fact that it is projected to be cost effective if upgraded may encourage
the City to make those capital expenses necessary to met the reduction target of 58.5%, and
become a major source of credits.
As in Zone 1, the larger Zone 2 facilities are clustered near the top of the rankings for p e
tential cost effectiveness. Therefore, it is unlikely that Zone 2 will demand more credits than
can be supplied.
337. For example, many of Zone 4's facilities have extremely low cost efficiency ratings.
Many also have very small volumes: 9 have nitrogen removal rates of 10 lbs./day or less. It
would be logical for these plants to buy credits because they are not cost effective and do not
have the capacity to produce many credits for export. But, these facilities are small enough
so that they alone will not drain the supply of credits.
338. It is important to keep in mind that prevailing market conditions will change with
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5.

Additional Market Considerations

Two problems which must be recognized in all of these discussions are the weaknesses in the available data concerning costs, and
the potential impact of government funding. Cost estimates, in
their initial stages, have varied widely, and officials have pointed
out the degree to which the figures must be refined when more
precise plans for each plant are drawn.339
The impact which government funding of plant upgrades has on
a market based trading program also requires additional evaluation. Traditionally, federal and state governments have underwritten substantial portions of local upgrades, either through direct
grants or through revolving loan programs.u0 Both New York and
Connecticut employ grant and loan programs which are prioritized
' the extent
to target the most urgently needed projects f i r ~ t . ~To
that a plant benefits from a state grant or loan, is there a distortion
of the market? The answer is not clear, especially when we consider that all of the funds we are discussing are public monies,
whether they come from the federal, state or local government.
Grants and loans obviously favor the localities which receive them.
This "inequity" would occur whether there was a trading program
or not. All grants and loans could be suspended in order to keep a
each step taken toward achieving the 58.5% reduction target. After Phase I11 begins, s u b
stantial reductions in nitrogen discharges will be required every five years for the next ten
years. Potential sellers will have fewer credits to sell as their discharge limits become more
&ingent, credit demand could be expected to rise, and credit prices might increase significantly. Adjusting to the ensuing market conditions will be inother challenge for administrators and market participants to overcome.
339. S c c P t w ~
I11 PROPOSAL,
supranote 21, at 11. Scc ako Letter from Alan I. Stubin, D e p
uty Chief, Marine Sciences Section, New York City Department of Environmental Protection, to Mark Tedesco, Region I1 Coordinator, Long Island Sound Office 3 (Oct. 25, 1996)
(on file with author) (current cost and nitrogen riduction estimates are based largely on
limited pilot scale studies and early cost and efficiency projections).
340. The construction grants program established under Title I1 of the Clean Water Act,
33 U.S.C. 1281 et seq., provided billions of dollars in grants. It was substantially modified by
the Clean Water Act amendments of 1987 and the bulk of the fund was used to capitalize
state revolving loan programs. This was part of a Congressional effort to phase out the grant
program and to encourage communities to assume more of the burden of funding improvements to local sewage treatment plants. See 133 CONG.REC. S19 (daily ed. Jan.6,1987)
(remarks of Sen. Mitchell).
341. Both New York and Connecticut provide low cost loans to localities to finance treatment plant construction and upgrades. Connecticut also provides grants to cover a portion
of the costs, usually twenty percent. &PHASE I11 PROPOSAL,supra note 21, at 1415; CCMP,
supra note 2, at 160-163. While these funds are prioritized to address the most critical municipal sewage needs first, nitrogen removal is only one of the factors considered.
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level field for trading, but that would be politically difficult, and
would not necessarily make the trading program fair or efficient.
Alternatively, one might question whether a trading program is
warranted where there is a strong regulatory program in which
standards can be tightened as necessary to accomplish water quality
goals, and where the government could achieve cost efficiency by
carefully targeting its funding to dischargers most directly impacting the Sound and having the best potential to economically reduce substantial levels of nitrogen loadings.
C.

Duration of Credits

In any trading program the nature and duration of pollution
credits must be carefully defined. The Clean Air Act specifically
provides that sulfur dioxide allowances are a limited authorization
to emit the pollutant and do not constitute a property right;"' a water trading program should contain the same provision. Moreover,
the exact duration of the credits must be carefully chosen and
spelled out. In a situation where increasingly stringent limits are to
be phased in, such as the Title IV acid deposition program, dischargers might find long-lived credits more attractive than shortlived ones since they can bank credits to meet future control requirements. That is not necessarily the case here. If the 58.5 percent reduction goal proves sufficient to achieve the desired environmental results, then more stringent limits may be unnecessary.
Moreover, there is less certainty about future requirements in a water trading program than the Title IV program since the former is
not specifically enshrined in the federal statute. Congress might
choose in the next few years to modify the Clean Water Act, potentially affecting any existing trading program. In addition, it may
not be wise to allow long term credits if it creates the potential for
sizable future discharges which could have a deleterious impact on
water quality. Accordingly, a relatively short credit duration may
be appropriate, perhaps one year, with a yearly accounting and settlement of transfers.
D. Administrative Issues
One of the major drawbacks of a pollutant trading program is
the administrative cost entailed with its operation. These rise as
342. Clean Air Act 5 403(f), 42 U.S.C. 5 7651b(f).
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programs become increasingly complicated and hard to administer. It is often difficult to assess costs or to evaluate reductions, and
no real cost estimates have been prepared for a Long Island Sound
trading program. Depending on the structure adopted, some entity must monitor trades, keep records and perhaps provide a banking mechanism to support the purchase and sale of credits. Experience has shown that credit transactions often have higher
transaction costs than originally anticipated, particularly if regulators must validate every trade. If the ecological impact of the pollutant traded is not similar for all the participating sources, as in
the present case, the transaction costs can be particularly high."'
Monitoring can also present a significant cost item, but a thorough monitoring program is an essential element of a trading program. In this case monitoring would entail extensive water quality
sampling and analysis to determine the impact of discharges on the
Sound as a whole, and on local discharge areas. It would also require more thorough monitoring of effluent discharges, which may
vary over time, as well as a strict enforcement regime. The requisite monitoring and enforcement costs are unknown, as is the question of evaluating and avoiding local water impacts. An equally
important issue is raised by the notorious reluctance of state and
federal officials to enforce compliance by resistant local governm e n t ~ Finally,
. ~ ~ ~ if a banking feature is included in the program,
the administrative load and the transactions costs are certain to be
even greater.
In thinking about these questions we should also keep in mind
that administrative choices may be strongly influenced by political
realities. Previous experience with sewage treatment planning has
shown that local political consideration can "dominate ecological
343. Tlading in a Long Island Sound program would not be done on a unit for unit basis,
but would entail calculation of trading ratios.
344. It was the Long Island Soundkeeper who filed suit under Clean Water Act fj 505 on
March 9,1998, against the City of New York for failing to achieve compliance at several of its
plants. The complaint also alleged over 4500 illegal discharges of nitrogen by eight of the
City's plants over the past two years. Long Island Soundkeeper, et.al. v. New York City Dept.
of Environmental Protection, No. CV-981635 (E.D. N.Y., filed March 9,1998). The State of
Connecticut subsequently intervened in the suit, and New York State filed a similar action in
state court. State of New York v. City of New York, No. 98/400817 (S.Ct. N.Y., filed Mar. 9,
1998). Scc also David Miller, Nitrogm Ruluction For LIS ChoIlmge4 LISS UPDATE,
Fall 1997, at
2 (noting that New York sewage treatment operaton themselves resist nitrogen removal).
~nforcementis an area which has presented problems nationwide and connnues to be a
subject of serious concern. victor B. Flatt, A Dirty River Rum Through It (The Failure of Enfmummt in the Clcan Water Act), 25 B.C.E
m AFFAIRSL. REV. 1 (1997).
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circumstances and technocratic rati~nality."~
E.

Political Realities

Any decision to engage in nitrogen trading on the Sound is a political as well as an economic i s s ~ e . " ~
Most POTWs are under the
control of a local political jurisdiction, generally a town or county.
Consequently, questions regarding the local jurisdiction's authority
to spend funds for purchases of credits may arise. Even if the
authority exists, plant operators may have a preference for engineering solutions, and may prefer to meet their discharge obligations in the traditional manner.
Provided plant operators conclude that trading is the most beneficial option, there may be real difficulty in convincing elected officials that sending local tax dollars to another jurisdiction is appropriate. Reluctance might be even greater if the purchase were
made from a private discharger, especially one in another jurisdiction."' Questions of equity may be raised, since .the areas having
the most impact on water quality in the Sound are typically more
aflluent. Would these wealthier counties choose to make the large
capital investment in new or upgraded facilities; would less prosperous localities choose instead to purchase credits, thereby transferring funds to the wealthier jurisdiction? How many jurisdictions
would choose to make large unmandated capital expenditures in
the hopes of trading in the future? If credits are given a lengthy
duration, and freely marketed, how many public officials would actually choose to purchase or sell credits for future use, essentially
speculating with public money? There are no real answers to any
of these questions.
VIII. CONCLUSION

Long Island Sound has been targeted for restoration so that this
345. Set Latin, RcgulafotyFailure, supa note 180,at 1656.
346. As Professor Hahn noted, the choice of a program 'with wonderN efficiency prop
erties, but which ignores political concerns is likely to remain a theoretical curiosity."
HAHN, supra note 11, at 18 (discussing the diversity of interest group perspectives and their
influence on policy choices).
347. The question becomes even more complicated if the program were expanded to
include nonpoint sources, since the governmental entities having responsibilities for the
land areas which are the sources of runoff may not be the same as those having responsibility for sewage treatment.
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resource can remain robust for generations to come. It has been
determined that nitrogen loadings have been the main culprit contributing to hypoxic conditions in the Sound, and any program
that can help redress this problem should be explored. Supporters
of a nitrogen trading program see it as offering a potentially cost
effective mechanism to help achieve the necessary reductions.
However, the program must operate within the context of existing
laws and policies, with due regard for administrative and political
realities. Further, in fairness to those facilities which pledge their
support to achieving the overall reduction goal, any trading program selected must do its best to ensure that the promised economic benefits materialize.
The Long Island Sound trading proposals pass at least part of
this litmus test. A trading program could operate within the constraints of the Clean Water Act, through a TMDL process implemented within the context of the NPDES permit program. It a p
propriately is limited to a single pollutant, obviously reflects a
watershed approach to pollution control, and would likely lead to
enhanced ambient monitoring, thus adhering to the principles
spelled out by the Environmental Protection Agency for trading
programs.
Although previous pollutant trading programs enacted throughout the country have not resulted in active markets, we can glean
from them certain characteristics that appear to contribute to
overall results. The program should have clear goals, carefully
spelled out and agreed upon by its participants. A trading baseline
should be established, optimally in the form of a stringent limit on
pollutant loadings. That limit should be a market driver and preferably should decrease over time to accord with Clean Water Act
goals. Sufficient difference in control costs must exist to provide
an incentive to trade. The trading participants should be relatively
homogeneous, and there should be a sufficient level of participation to insure a viable market, however, not to the extent that it becomes difficult to identify trading partners and increases transaction costs. The pollutant traded should be regional in nature, and
emissions from various sources should have identical impacts on
the protected resource. Monitoring must be adequate both to insure against local impacts and to prevent evasion of control limitations. There must be a credible enforcement program and the political will to carry it out. Overall, the program should be as simple
as possible with low transaction costs.
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While the exact specifications of a Sound trading program have
yet to be determined, it does appear to satisfy a number of these
criteria. The program has a straightforward agreed upon goal, and
a relatively modest number of potential trading participants with
uniform types of discharges. Present cost estimates indicate sufficient disparity in control costs to stimulate a market. The Clean
Water Act framework contains the mechanisms needed to establish
the essential requirements for trading: a baseline, along with a
monitoring and enforcement scheme. Monitoring will, however,
need to be increased, and careful attention should be given to
permit drafting, enforcement and citizen participation.
On the negative side, the use of trading ratios would likely complicate the process, increasing the complexity of the program and
presumably adding to administrative burdens and transaction costs.
The exact extent of this burden cannot be evaluated at the present
time, and additional work must be done to more firmly fix all cost
estimates. Determining the actual economic value of the trading
program is made especially difficult because of the use of government funding, which is a sharp departure from an economist's free
market ideal. Indeed, it is not clear that a trading program
achieves any real cost reduction over the traditional regulatory
program which can mandate pollution reductions and provide
much of the necessary funds.
In addition, there remains a substantial possibility of local environmental impacts which increases the need for monitoring and
raises administrative costs. Also, past experience indicates that enforcement against local entities is likely to be weak. Finally, it remains to be seen whether municipal officials will be driven by politics, rather than economics.
In the final analysis, a Long Island Sound nitrogen trading program appears, on paper at least, to meet some but not all of the criteria thought to indicate the potential for a successful trading program. Nevertheless there appears to be strong interest on the part
of various state and federal officials, and they may determine that it
is worth proceeding with such a program in spite of the uncertainties. But judging from experiences with previous market based
programs, it is entirely possible that even if a nitrogen trading program is established, the amount of trading will be minimal. If that
is the case, we can only hope that the same phenomenon we witnessed in other locales occurs on the Sound, with facilities reducing their loadings below permitted levels and thus achieving pollu-
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tion reduction goals despite the lack of trades. If these reductions
are achieved equitably, and at substantially reduced control costs
and modest transaction costs then the Sound and the public will
benefit. Otherwise we may later regard it as an interesting, but
wasted effort.
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